

JPRS-WER-85-101

11 December 1985

West Europe Report

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

MOCK'S POSITION AS OeVP LEADER THREATENED

Vienna PROFIL in German 30 Sep 85 pp 16-17

[Article by Franz Ferdinand Wolf: "Alois, What Do You Get Out Of It?"]

[Text] The OeVP [Austrian People's Party] chairman is fighting on two fronts: for his credibility and against rumors concerning a new OeVP candidate for Federal Chancellor.

Alois Mock somehow does not appear to be in good shape: he keeps lapsing into silence, gives hesitant answers and in between makes resigned statements about politics: "Many a good man has gone under, and many a bad one has succeeded." On his present situation: "Well, what we tried to keep from happening, has happened."

It has happened: Alois Mock is accused of shady dealings--as a zealous fundraiser and alleged currency smuggler for Bela Rabelbauer. The fugitive financial shark told a long story in the KRONE six years after the questionable contribution of several million to the OeVP took place. From "never-neverland" (which the criminal investigators believe to be New Zealand) he provides a new version of the particulars of the money transaction: "Mock and I were in Switzerland. We had lunch in the Hotel Weisses Roessli in Staad on Lake Constance. Then we drove to the Kantonalbank; I withdrew the money--more than 300,000 Swiss francs, turned the package over to Dr Mock and we started on the return trip. At the border in Hoechst the Chairman showed his diplomatic passport and the customs official immediately waved us through. At my house in Fussach the OeVP chief had a small cup of coffee, and then Dr Mock said good-bye."

Alois Mock reacted to this Rabelbauer story with a suit of defamation of character; the OeVP with total denials, referring to the transcript of the AKH investigation committee, where Big Bela had told an entirely different story. Former OeVP election campaign manager Kurt Bergmann declared that Mock had never touched a single schilling of Rabelbauer's and that he, Bergmann, was the only one who had handled contributions from him. The witnesses cited by friend Bela contradicted the story also, bank cashier Arthur Schlaepfer ("I never saw Dr Mock in the bank") as well as Rabelbauer's secretary and his maid. Even the witnesses named by the fugitive financier in a second attempt deny any contact with Mock.

Nevertheless--Mock's main political asset has been put into question--his honesty. It turned out the the OeVP chairman, who in any case is more decent than politically glamorous, more proper than sharp, had closer political contacts with the finance manipulator than had previously been known. Even after all the nastiness involved in the contribution transfer will have been completely cleared up, the public will still retain one impression from the KRONE scoop: Mock was in Switzerland together with that strange carpetbagger. Should a topflight politician do such a thing?

Alois Mock tries to reconstruct the happenings of that day and states that his wife had accompanied him to that famous Swiss lunch. The couple's little Swiss excursion with Rabelbauer, he says, had no element of drama: "While we were eating, he told me about the citizens' forum, he said that there would have to be changes in taxation policy; that the Greens must be taken seriously, and who knows what else."

In the end there was coffee at the house of the contributor, who had been recommended to him by a Vorarlberg industrialist, and the whole thing lasted "perhaps from noon until 3 pm." Period.

To be sure, the meeting during the Bregenz Arts Festival was no coincidence. During those weeks in the summer of 1979 Mock had several contacts with the millionaire. There was a meeting in Vienna about 2 or 3 days before Mock's election to party chairman in July 1979, and probably another one shortly after the party elections. Mock remembers: "During that discussion he said: 'Don't you ever come to Vorarlberg?'"

Shortly thereafter the new party chief attended the Bregenz festival as he had done in years past. No coincidence.

A few weeks later the matter continued. Says Mock: "In September he came to Vienna; he called me one morning and said: 'I've spoken to you about my colleagues; they are officials in the Vienna OeVP; I'd like you to meet them.'" At Rabelbauer's suggestion, the meeting took place in the parliament building--"I had seen some of these people during the election campaign."

Alois Mock had inherited the million-schilling contributor from his predecessor Josef Taus, who had mobilized all his resources during the 1979 election campaign--and lost.

When Mock took over in the party the financial situation was more than sad. The People's Party had once again lost an election and urgently needed money to pay its bills. The millions promised by Rabelbauer had already been spent during the final phase of the campaign. The new chairman wanted to take care of the pressing financial matters immediately upon taking office, and Bela Rabelbauer had a long-hoped-for opportunity: to have a political party beholden to him and thus to have good connections if the need should arise.

The OeVP took the bait, even though Rabelbauer had had two serious previous convictions back in 1964. Ten years later, Minister of Justice Christian Broda took action to have them stricken from the record in an amnesty action.

Be that as it may, the party and its chairman have had dealings with the carpetbagger for 6 years. The mildest approach directed at Mock inside the party: maladroitness.

The contribution affair had hardly come to light in 1980 when Mock ordered the 10 million returned. This greatly angered some contribution-wise political pros of his party who would dearly have loved to save themselves the trouble of raising 10 million schillings after losing an election. They appealed to keep the money and sit out the crisis. All this is being raised again, since the opposition has realized that the million-schilling story still has not been settled. As the party chairman describes the current mood: "Of course there are some who are saying now: well, Alois, and what good is it to you now?"

No good at all, and a bad reputation to boot in some parts of the party, which depresses him: "Efforts at being honest are not entitled to applause; but this is certainly a disappointment."

"We'll have to get over this," says Alois Mock, more to himself than to his party, which shows some derisive sympathy for the "bad luck that Alois is having with this thing," as one party member puts it. And even the next story sounds like less of an offensive defense than a pensive reflection on the things that can happen to a man in politics. A few days before the KRONE attack against his credibility he was asked a question that made no sense to him: "Tell me," said a member of another party, "have you ever been inside a bank with Rabelbauer?"

In retrospect he can appreciate the significance of this offhand question. Since that time, he has been convinced that he is the target of a smear campaign and when asked whether he can discern a guiding hand behind the series of Rabelbauer disclosures, he simply answers "yes."

He does not want to say more, because "this is an extremely nasty story, and it is very important to be extremely reticent in this situation." But he says this much: "There is a plan to this; they keep hammering away at it."

The leader of the opposition is engaged in a war on two fronts. About the same time as the fugitive's never-neverland stories began to surface, all kinds of rumors and comments about Alois Mock's political future started circulating in political circles. One hinted that perhaps during the next National Council elections the OeVP would take the FRG as an example and would differentiate between the party chairman and the candidate for chancellor. Just as in the FRG election victor Johannes Rau would undertake the stressful role of candidate for chancellor, a provincial ruler in Austria might become a candidate to succeed Sinowatz. The putative candidate: Josef Ratzenboeck, for whom the pollsters predict brilliant success in next weekend's Landtag elections in Upper Austria.

Ratzenboeck denies this.

Alois Mock disagrees also. He does not do so with a cold contradiction, but rather with a small analysis which at the same time gives an insight into

his present state of mind: "Based on the strength shown by the individual provinces, the same question is always raised during difficult phases: who is going to Vienna? During the 6 years of my party chairmanship this has occurred three or four times. Just because there are so many highly interesting things to be done in the provinces and because the role of the opposition is such a difficult one, on one goes to Vienna."

The way Alois Mock says this on that evening in his big office in the house of parliament, it sounds almost as if he were sorry.

9273/13167
CSO: 3620/36

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ZEIT CALLS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING LAWS AGAINST RIOTERS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 4 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Hans Schueler: "Blind Violence: Rioters are not Demonstrators"]

[Text] The first 2 nights of this week have now guaranteed a place in the public awareness as well for a state of affairs which was previously known at best among police commissioners and which those aware of it were quite reluctant to talk about: In all the larger cities of the Federal Republic there has come into being a latent potential for violence in hundreds of people which any event in any place can bring to spontaneous and nearly simultaneous outbursts. When this happens, the police are no longer in a position to call a halt in time to the destructive rioting. The place names Hamburg, Bremen, Oldenburg, Hannover, Gottingen, Munster, Bielefeld, Duisburg, Frankfurt, Heilbronn, Erlangen, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Tübingen, Freiburg and Munich represent a new kind of geography of crime. In all those places during the nights of Sunday to Monday, and in some cases also from Monday to Tuesday, groups of rockers, punks and other rioters moved through the downtown commercial districts and even the suburbs, shattered hundreds of shop windows, looted stores, set fires and overturned parked cars.

At times during several hours of the night, downtown areas were under the rule of the streets. The police were surprised and powerless, even though the delinquents had all but painted their faces to get themselves arrested. Neither the meeting on the previous weekend of the NDP, which the mayor of Frankfurt had tolerated--it took place in a closed meeting room and was not even subject to authorization--nor the death of the demonstrator Gunter Sare were causes for the explosion of violence. They merely triggered it, just as a ridge of snow kicked loose triggers an avalanche.

The violence of the rioters in the Federal Republic is apolitical; it "circulates within itself," as the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG aptly described it. The rioters did not know the person who died beneath the wheels of the police water cannon and certainly not in the least the motives for which he once again set out to demonstrate "contrary to the appropriate way." They were not indignant about his death but rather took it as a welcome new provocation.

Meanwhile, politicians and journalists with a right-wing point of view are still talking as if the whole problem could be solved if only we had the

right laws and decisive people to enforce them. Mayor Wallmann of Frankfurt: "I challenge the lawmakers to pass clear-cut regulations which make it possible to prohibit demonstrations where there is a well-founded expectation of violent excesses." The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE even attributes the disaster to the recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court pertaining to the mostly non-violent demonstrations in Brokdorf in 1981 in which the essential idea was that the right of peaceful demonstrators to express openly their opinions must be preserved even at the risk of malicious people using it as an occasion for acts of violence.

That is merely propagating nonsense. The applicable laws on gatherings enables every city or country administration to forbid a gathering in advance "if under recognizable circumstances public safety or order is directly endangered if the gathering were to take place." What more does Walter Wallmann want?

He has apparently overlooked the fact that the events following the meeting of the NDP in Frankfurt and the counter-demonstration which concluded peacefully no longer have anything to do in the legal sense with demonstrations for which laws concerning demonstrators would be applicable. Violent individuals who, as in Hamburg, take shots at police officers with steel balls from the windows of their apartments are not committing a breach of the public peace. They are attempting murder. Even the rioters who throw stones at people from the midst of a peaceful gathering are reckoning with injuring them. They must be arrested and receive a punishment commensurate with the seriousness of their deeds. Why this does not always happen is difficult to understand. The interior senator of Hamburg and the mayor of Frankfurt, in any case at least their duly-qualified authorities for public order, know the names and addresses of the suspects. If they were caught in the act, then they must be condemned to long prison terms whose consistent execution would also effectively deter possible sympathizers and blind imitators. They are criminals and must be punished as such.

Whether or not it is preferable to accommodate a demonstration in the interest of its legitimate goals and set aside individual citizens' rights to freedom from interference--as can be expedient with temporary obstructions of street traffic--such tactical considerations by the police make no sense in the face of violent individuals rising up in large numbers. In such a case, only draconian severity helps. The responsible authorities must decide to use it. The much-touted and inalienable state monopoly on the use of force derives its justification not least of all from the fact that it is also enforced.

13137/1223²
CSO: 3620/39

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

KOHL'S POWER BASE SAID TO BE SOLID

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 85 p 1

/Commentary by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Chancellor on a More Solid Base"/

/Text/ Many a CDU/CSU politician is getting nervous about next year's Lower Saxony elections. Yet Minister President Albrecht has gained a great reputation in his 9 years in office, and there is not much anyone can do about that. Further, the 1987 Bundestag elections are already casting a shadow on the government coalition in Bonn. A number of things which should be taken care of now, such as a thorough reform of the statutory medical insurance, are being postponed to the time after the winter of 1986/87. Legislative policy, a matter of constant dispute in the coalition, is being left alone; only a particularly unsuccessful portion of the current (SPD-FDP passed) divorce law, the alimony settlement, is to be correct somewhat. Fewer decisions, fewer difficulties, fewer annoyances--a questionable maxim!

If one visualizes the storms this government has weathered, one really ought to be amazed that the chancellor has made only few changes in his cabinet. He lost Economics Minister Lambsdorff when the latter was involved in criminal proceedings. He gained Schaeuble as minister at the Office of the Chancellor. It had long since been decided that in light of the next election Family Minister Geissler should devote himself full time to his post of secretary general in the CDU. He was succeeded by Professor Suessmuth, and it is too soon for Kohl to tell whether she will be a plus for his administration. While causing misgivings to a lot of CDU/CSU voters (not only men), the subdued type of feminism she presents will leave leftwing voters coolly indifferent. If he has his way, Kohl will probably not replace any further ministers. He will not follow demands being made from among the CDU that he should present some new faces. Hurried changes in personnel before an election have the effect of an admission of failure and loosen party loyalty.

In the Office of the Chancellor things have been working better since Schaeuble was asked to take charge. Decisions are being prepared more thoroughly and are being put on the road toward implementation more purposefully. The question remains as to whether the top post (under the chancellor) is set up effectively, whether it is not overloaded--with a Federal minister, an undersecretary, a parliamentary secretary and a civil service secretary. But it is more a question of economy there than one of efficiency. The new government spokesman is proving

an industrious and circumspect man, well versed in the economic and financial field. Doubts as to whether this is enough can hardly be heard any longer from among the government camp. Nor would they lead to anything, for in no circumstances could Kohl consider replacing his spokesman for a third time without compelling reasons.

The government is doing all right with the coalition deputies in the Bundestag. The FDP ones have been less of a nuisance since the government virtually cut legislative policy from its program altogether. Occasional outbursts by the CDU/CSU deputies--like the ones now over the Germany decision--have narrow objectives and do not last long. No danger threatens Kohl from that direction.

The change in his relationship with Genscher, which is not only becoming apparent in the differences between the two over the U.S. SDI space project, is bound to be cause for more serious concern for him. There is a good deal more at stake. The foreign minister does not want to allow the chancellor and his staff to wrest important parts of foreign policy from him. The chancellor, in turn, does not want to allow the foreign minister to exclude him from foreign policy and to limit him to merely abiding by his will. The old relationship of trust between Kohl and Genscher, which the former probably considered closer and more lasting than the latter, has worn thin.

This is partly due to Genscher not having been able to hold on to the FDP chairmanship. Actually the fact that Genscher lost this post should have made the change in the relationship more tolerable for Kohl. But Genscher continues to carry greater weight in the FDP than is being provided by his ministerial post and his seat on the party presidium. This also has to do with continuing uncertainty about Bangemann. He is becoming popular in the FDP as a skilled moderator, but is he going to head the party?

All things considered, Kohl's chancellorship is on solid ground for the time being. And so the rash summer slogans in the CDU/CSU environment about an allegedly advisable quick change of chancellors have vanished. The CDU/CSU and the coalition will face the electorate with this Federal chancellor in 1987. Kohl's election prospects are not poor today. Of course, Social Democrat Rau will be a dangerous opponent--particularly if he manages to have the leftwing formations of his party almost disappear behind his person. But Kohl has noteworthy successes in domestic and foreign policy to his credit.

Less impressive so far has been the image presented by the coalition and its chancellor. Oratory, gestures, appearance are not humbug but important political tools. If they were preeminent in the confrontation, however, Schmidt, whose gifts were not exhausted in this area, would still have to be chancellor. A speech delivered like brilliant fireworks: is it really considered more important than anything else by the people--or, after all, only by a small minority with special (worthwhile) esthetic standards, which incidentally is satisfied with only a tiny number of the fastidious themselves?

8790/12228
CSO: 3620/61

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LOSS OF ECONOMICALLY VULNERABLE VOTERS BLAMED FOR CDU SLUMP

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 9 Oct 85 p 3

/Article by L. B.: "'The Identity of the CDU as a People's Party Is At Stake'--Cologne Internal Party Election Analysts Blames Worms and Kohl For Defeat"/

/Text/ Duesseldorf, 8 Oct--An internal investigation by the Rhine party office in Cologne into the causes of the defeat at the Landtag elections in May is circulating among the leaders of the North Rhine-Westphalia CDU. The paper deals with the effect of Federal Government policy on the voters, with the planning and execution of the election campaign in North Rhine-Westphalia, with the role played by former top candidate Worms, who is still Rhine chairman, and with the party's public image. The study, written by the fulltime staff of the office, was submitted to Chairman Worms recently but not released by him for publication. In its present version, which apparently is milder than the first drafts, the paper bears the title "Internal Discussion Contribution Concerning the Situation of the Rhineland CDU and the Factors Determining Its Position."

The authors note that at the Duesseldorf Landtag elections this year the CDU suffered its "worst defeat so far," its 36.5-percent portion of the vote representing the "poorest election result of all 10 Landtag elections since 1947." This result had changed the political landscape to such a degree that the party now was forced to ponder its future as a people's party in the most densely population Land of the republic. The structure of the CDU was in jeopardy because in farflung stretches of the Land, and also in many of its traditional strongholds, it was no longer represented by directly elected deputies. Among voters up to age 35--more so among women than among men--and in the big cities, the CDU was not reaching as much as one-third of the population any longer. In the Ruhr its "chronic minority" had already dropped to 26 percent. "Results capable of leading to a majority, it has managed to obtain only among the older rural and small-town population. Its identity as a people's party is at stake." These profound losses in confidence, the paper continues, "are undermining the substance of the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia."

The study criticizes the election campaign under top candidate Worms. It talks about a "dogmatic influence" exercised by a number of opinion poll institutes on the image presented by the party and about a lack of new incentives. The key election campaign slogan "No Upswing for North Rhine-Westphalia Except

"With Us" had been based on the upswing thesis of the 1983 election, but the upswing thesis of the year 1985. In the meantime, the CDU had come to know the effects of national recession. The CDU's self-portrait of the people affected included pensioners, handicapped persons, refugees, unemployed persons, and persons threatened by unemployment and economic decline. In contrast, the effects placed in the upswing were not political, but economic. The CDU's "clear image"--typical of the party before the 1983 election--had faded, and it was no longer able to portray itself as a party that represented the interests of all strata of the population. "It can no longer be said that the CDU is the party of the people." The CDU's criticism of the government's economic policies was interpreted as "defeatism." The 1983 election was the last straw for the CDU, led by the CDU at the same time as the party's "golden summer land" of many citizens of North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as the party's failure to mobilize its past supporters. The result of the 1983 election had already led to a dwindling of confidence in victory, and although the 1985 election campaign led to an increasingly worsening "climate of opinion."

All these theses are to be understood in the broad ramifications of the plan with which Worms, in coordination with the CDU, prepared the campaign for the North Rhine-Westphalia election. In this, the self-portrait, the paper continues, is intact, "but there is a lack of confidence in policy." Instances of irritation which have been cited are the health of Kohl, who, and Biedenkopf since the fall of 1984, are no longer in contact. The originally clearly defined responsibilities in the party have been blurred, and have shifted alternately to a large number of party leaders--"from Berlin to the course of the election campaign--to Maastricht, to Brussels, to Dusseldorf, to Cologne." By Dusseldorf is meant the party's other officers, by "Berlin" the national CDU office, by Solingen the party's headquarters in the country, by "Brussels" the Westphalian CDU leadership, and by "Brussels" the party headquarters. "Promotion misses its aim if trends, the other social conditions do not correspond to it." As for the large-scale loss of supporters and voters, the paper states that "visual promotion is successful in extremes."

Concerning the party's self-portrait, the authors write that "overrighteousness, the patronizing of citizens in their judgments, their aloofness and a lack of tolerance detract from the credibility and the image of the party." The party of the CDU acronym which stands for "democracy" is not standard of our politics." Berlin and Frankfurt were the main points of view that the FRP definitely was able to enlist support with original, innovative, social sensitivity, amenability to cultural variety and an openness for other ways of life. In parts of North Rhine-Westphalia, however, especially in the Ruhr, a "climate of opinion" had already "developed in which there is hardly any room for the CDU any longer, except perhaps in situations and events imposed."

The authors urgently advise the party and the media to make North Rhine-Westphalia to participate more strongly in the different "cultural, cultural and intellectual life." The CDU was missing the connection with cultural movements and subjects of debate. "it suffers from a dearth of critics and from not getting in touch." The party was running the risk of becoming a "longevity" party with obsoles-

and even distrust by the population. It was not enough for the party to present an image on ceremonial or social occasions. "The CDU must also be present wherever people meet; it must articulate interests and form opinions wherever they develop new ideas and wherever intellectual debates take place."

8790/12228
CSO: 3620/64

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ZIMMERMANN, ALTHOUGH WEAKENED, WILL REMAIN IN OFFICE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 4 Oct 85 p 5

[Analysis by Nina Grunenberg: "Nobody Talks Resignation Any More--But the Prestige of the Minister of the Interior Has Been Impaired Even in Government Circles"]

[Text] Bonn, early October--In the Zimmerman affair everybody sought to protect his own interests. But in the end almost nothing had changed. The opposition had high hopes of finally being able to strike a decisive blow against the disliked minister of the interior. But it did not have sufficient clout. An investigative committee has now been appointed to deal with the matter. But no one can say that a minister of the interior who refuses to grant permission for an inquiry because the legal prerequisites have not been met, would be an ideal target for the outrage of liberal Democrats. It will be difficult to prove that Zimmerman engaged in any specific misconduct. Since there is a lack of political substance, the only things left to denounce are the minister's personal style and human weaknesses. If nothing else should turn up, this department chief who has grown a thick skin in 28 years of power struggle, would not see a threat in the investigative panel--at worst, a nuisance. "In 2 months," he believes, "this will have blown over. By then the band will be playing somewhere else."

He has bigger problems with the question marks with which his own political friends have greeted the way he runs his office. At the head of the pack is his old opponent and present coalition partner, the FDP, whose dealings with Zimmerman in the political arena which the liberals established themselves prior to the change in government, are slightly on the libidinous side. To satisfy on the one hand their obligations as coalition partners, but on the other hand to demonstrate their resolute ambivalence, they agreed upon the vague formula to "not overthrow" the minister of the interior, "but not to support him either."

The CDU, whose favorite politician Zimmerman has never been, gave him only halfhearted support too in this affair. From that quarter, the 18 months' quarrel about the low-pollution automobile is more of a bother than the defected spies. The party is having problems from its members because of their frustrated expectations. The fact that he had engaged in gut fighting with the car manufacturers in that matter did not improve his performance in their eyes.

The CSU, whose gang leader Zimmermann is in the Bonn cabinet, is casting a jaundiced eye on him also. In his relationship with Franz Josef Strauss he is still suspected of having made a deal with Helmut Kohl during the birth pangs of the change in government, rather than to have supported Franz Josef Strauss, who had wanted to plow the liberals under in the new elections immediately after the change in September 1982. But even at the best of times, Helmut Kohl's relationship with Friedrich Zimmerman could only be described as cool and business-like. In fact, when the minister of the interior in the summer of 1983 temporarily occupied the key spot as the standard bearer of the change in government and his fans called him the only strong personality in the cabinet, his relations with the chancellor deteriorated very quickly. In the meantime, the pressure on him coming from Munich had increased also. His party friends championed those worthy causes which they had proclaimed prior to the change: the rights of foreigners, freedom to demonstrate, rights of asylum. All of these had however created a lot of unwelcome domestic political trouble. Kohl's previously lukewarm support for the plans of his energetic minister diminished even further prior to the elections in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Depressed at least as much as the CDU over the election defeat, which occurred despite an abstinence in internal politics, and in addition provoked by the constant accusations of being nothing but a "minister for proclamations," "Fritz" Zimmerman blew his top. Rather than first taking his complaints to the Federal Chancellor, he immediately went before the TV cameras and demanded the chancellor's support in reforming the laws concerning foreigners in front of the entire nation. "Typical for Zimmerman," said his friends in Munich. This time the chancellor's pique was clearly recognizable. Munich seers are certain that the chancellor himself had brought up the name of Edmund Stoiber ("Don Edmondo") as a successor for Friedrich Zimmermann and thus gave a real push to the rumor mills. As fascinated and sensitive as always when observing the lower depths of human nature, the people in Munich contemplated these happenings. Not without admiration of a mature performance, but also with a trace of condescension, they said: "A real avenger, that Kohl."

As a rule, the Bavarians do not think much of executions which are initiated and cancelled halfway through. This violates their sense of humanitarianism. But the CSU was not at all surprised that the chancellor did nothing to give Zimmermann the coup de grace--the language of the people in power in Bonn sometimes invites comparison with Richard Nixon's tapes. The signal for this would have had to come from Munich. Everyone is in agreement on that.

But now no one speaks of resignation any more. However, the objective of the punishment was still attained; Zimmermann has been wounded. No one would still describe him as the "linchpin of the coalition." His reputation as a fire-eater has been impaired. Nor does anyone now take literally his proud slogan, borrowed from antiquity: "You don't have to love me, as long as you fear me." He will sit out the espionage affair just as Manfred Woerner did the Kiessling affair; Ignaz Kiechle the farmers' revolt, Christian Schwarz-Schilling the problems with the Sonnenschein firm. The word from Munich: "Soon the chancellor will have them all in his pocket. The only

ones still missing are Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gerhard Stoltenberg." Zimmermann's answer to the question whether he did not have too few friends for dealing with so many problems comes like a pistol shot: "I don't have too few friends--I have too little time." Only one thing truly irritated him during the entire affair: that Munich's liberal ABENDZEITUNG praised him for his reticence in the investigation matter, while the conservative FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG accused him of lacking courage. He is used to being caught between two fronts. But to find himself between two reversed fronts gives him food for thought.

Zimmermann emphasizes that he has no objection to an investigation, but that he knows that nothing much can be learned from G-10 proceedings. If they remain inconclusive, the law requires him so to inform the person investigated. Says Zimmermann: "No other state in the world has such a law." The requirement to tell the suspect subsequently "Friend, there was nothing to it" is for him a threshold over which he will not let himself be pushed even by the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE. "That wouldn't be courage; that would be stupidity," he says. "It would mean that I should stand up in the trenches, while everyone else keeps on squatting. I'm not that stupid."

He has some problems with the casual evaluation of the options open to him even by his friends in the party. To the suggestion that he disregard the finer points of the G-10 law, he replies loudly and angrily: "I am after all the minister in charge of protecting the constitution!"

In the final analysis the Zimmermann affair is reduced to a criticism of style. That is another reason why it is disappearing so quickly. He is being reproached for being what he is--a man who sees everything in terms of black and white: who in his relations with his subordinates speaks only in generalities; who pretends taking strong corrective action rather than to create an atmosphere of trust; and who lamentably neglects communications with the fraction and parliament.

He is criticized also for having further worsened his own image problems by the choice of his closest assistants. This is true of Parliamentary State Secretary Carl-Dieter Spranger, a rightwing CSU man who overcompensates for his personal inhibitions with political aggression. Despite his limited talents he is the minister of the interior's political confidant.

Zimmermann's position has been weakened--but then there are many weak people in Bonn. He himself is content over the fact that he is once again on speaking terms with his two most important patrons. Monday morning he visited the Federal Chancellor for a long-hoped-for discussion about the guest workers' problem raised by the Turkish EC Association. Last Sunday he had a 2-hour audience with Franz Josef Strauss. And on Saturday he went to the Oktoberfest. To keep the people in the beer tent from immediately recognizing him, he wore a red scarf and pulled a big black peasant's hat low over his face. But if the disguise had been intended as a security measure, it proved to be unnecessary: "On the way to the men's room people were forever toasting me with their beer mugs. The way the people acted, they seemed to think that I am a particularly well-suited minister in charge of security." He needed that. He cannot but agree. "When I look around me," he says with perfect matter-of-factness, "I see few people who do a better job than I." In Bonn, everything is relative.

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TELTSCHIK REVIEWS OSTPOLITIK AT CONFERENCE

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 14 Oct 85 p 4

/Article by V. M.: "'The Soviet Union Remains the Main Party To Be Addressed Within the Bloc'"/

/Text/ Nuernberg, 13 Oct--The division chief in the Office of the Federal Chancellor responsible for foreign policy, Teltschick, expounded the Ostpolitik of the Federal Government and the prospects of relations with the East European nations in Nuernberg before the German Society for East European Affairs. Teltschik's lecture may be considered the first cohesive presentation of Ostpolitik concepts coming from the Office of the Federal Chancellor. Teltschik made an effort to avoid any contrast with the Ostpolitik concepts of Foreign Minister Genscher, also stressing the great importance of the CSCE process, which enjoys Genscher's particular support. Nevertheless different points of emphasis were expressed in certain respects.

Teltschik made it clear that relations with the East were difficult when Federal Chancellor Kohl took charge of the government and that considerable progress had been made since. He defined the framework of German Ostpolitik as follows: It remains bound up in East-West relations, and the Federal Government therefore wants to plead for constructive relations with the East primarily with its most important alliance partner, the United States. To be able to do so, it must, however, keep its own relationship with the United States free of tension and amicable. Likewise it is important to coordinate with the European partners. On the other hand, the Federal Government cannot conduct Ostpolitik separately from the current relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact or, for that matter, without reference to domestic conditions in the various countries of that pact. The Soviet Union invariably remains the main party to be addressed, it being impossible to glance sideways at differences of interests within the Eastern bloc. Domestic developments within the Soviet Union itself are increasing in importance.

According to Teltschik, internal consensus is important as far as Ostpolitik is concerned. He says: "Party dissent, internal restiveness and attempts to prejudice Federal Government decisions through party politics undermine the government's freedom of action and offer to the Warsaw Pact countries opportunities of influence and propaganda advantages."

As far as Teltschik is concerned, the German question is the focal point of the Ostpolitik efforts of the Federal Republic. On the one hand, he approves of party Secretary Honecker wanting to develop constructive relations with the Federal Republic and to promote a policy of detente, although obstacles were put in his way temporarily by the Soviet leadership in fall 1984 because it apparently did not want its policy of resuming the dialogue with the Western superpower to be preempted by its alliance partners. On the other hand, Teltschik appealed to the East European countries and the Soviet Union to interpret the German question not as a threat but as a political challenge for seeking lasting solutions as part of a peaceful European order. If some East European countries more and more clearly are looking for national ways of their own, he says, they should have an understanding for the fact that the Germans of both states are also debating the question of their identity.

Teltschik then addressed a few words to individual Eastern countries. Poland, he said, with its attitude itself impeded the German policy of dialogue and Bonn's support for some of its points of view, for instance in the question of U.S. sanctions. It was in Poland that the revanchist campaign had found its greatest support, and personal attacks had been made against the Federal chancellor. Addressing Romania, Teltschik said: "The situation of the Germans in Romania remains a criterion for the quality of relations. The question of permission to leave is not always devoid of complications."

Most of the other lectures at this year's congress of the German Society for East European Affairs dealt with the likely effects of Gorbachev's policies on the position of the East European countries. The lecturers warned against classifying Gorbachev as a great liberal reformer, saying that at best he wanted to modernize the Soviet system and make it more efficient. The Hungarian party secretary, Kadar, too, apparently had been compelled to explain and justify his system to Gorbachev, and then also had to clear up his relationship with Czechoslovakia in Prague. The Hungarian way certainly continued to be tolerated, but, said publicist Lendvai, it was out of the question for it to be prescribed to the whole Eastern bloc as worth imitating.

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CSO: 3620/60

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PARTIES SEEN PREPARING FOR CHANGES FORCED BY 1987 ELECTIONS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The fact that there has been a majority government in the country continuously since 1977 is a good description of the stability of our political situation. Kalevi Sorsa's government is regarded as having a good chance of remaining in office throughout the whole election term now in progress. There is, however, no cause for getting bored. As soon as the 1987 parliamentary elections, the present conditions may have changed substantially.

While the next elections may still seem to be very far off, politicians and the parties have reason to sniff the winds of change in time and start to get ready for them. Signs of this have been seen. Recently, Prime Minister Sorsa himself during a newspaper interview briefly considered what kinds of challenges may await his own party, the Social Democrats, after the elections.

Support for the Left has been constantly declining, primarily due to the Communists' internal squabbles. The probable splitting of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and their entering the parliamentary elections on separate tickets may inevitably lead to sizable losses of seats in Parliament. Aside from that, viewed with disfavor by Moscow, Arvo Aalto's SKP will scarcely be fit to participate in any postelection government.

If the traditional core of the Center-Left government, the SDP [Social Democratic Party], the KEPU [Center Party] and the RKP [Swedish People's Party], loses its slim majority in Parliament, according to Sorsa, the coalition of the Social Democrats and the KEPU will have to seriously reconsider its position and perhaps come to an end altogether. Sorsa thus let it be understood that the Social Democrats cannot permanently count on the SMP [Finnish Rural Party]. Aside from being tactically shrewd, his view of the situation is also objectively understandable.

Since the Greens cannot provide people to fill the gap left by the Liberals, the SDP has no choice but to turn to the Conservative Party. What is at issue is a considerable change of attitude, which can hardly be achieved just like that. Time is needed for this and above all necessity dictated by realities.

As early as just before the Conservative Party congress last June, veteran SDP politician Veikko Helle launched a test balloon in the direction of the Conservative Party. Now Sorsa is ready to actually describe the Conservative Party "as a municipal center party" if only it will assume the proper nature.

If the Conservative Party were to do this, according to Sorsa's assurance, the SDP would be ready "to reconsider." Then "larger chambers," that is, the drawing rooms of the government, would be open to the Conservative Party.

Would the way then finally be open to a united, broadly based government coalition of the SDP, the KEPU and the Conservative Party? No, Sorsa rejected that outright. According to him, in such a government the Social Democrats would merely be "sponsors." That is -- although Sorsa has not yet said so -- for the government caretaker party the alternative of a Center-Left coalition would be a coalition of the SDP and the Conservative Party with the support of the little parties but without the KEPU.

The purely nonsocialist alternative of a Center-Left coalition is, of course, a government composed of the KEPU and the current little government parties. Whether this is a more likely model than the present coalition or an SDP-Conservative Party coalition is premature conjecture. It is, however, not at all premature to start to prepare ourselves for the fact that in future we may have to examine government coalitions on the basis of new premises.

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CSO: 3617/7

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SMALL GROUP OF SCHOLARS RESPONSIBLE FOR STUDYING USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Oct 85 p 31

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "The Unexplored Soviet Union"]

[Text] "There is only a small group of Sovietologists and there are no successors in sight. Becoming rooted in an old liturgy may bring its own revenge," the director of the Soviet Institute says.

Waldemar Melanko, the director of the Soviet Institute, which is supported by the Finnish Government, is concerned over the fact that we in Finland have not yet come to realize that a distinct change of generations has occurred and is occurring in both countries.

"Today's younger generation speaks a different language than the older one. In Finland becoming rooted in an old liturgy may bring its own revenge in the future. I fear that at this rate in 5 years time we will be in considerable difficulties," Melanko said.

According to him, Finns and Soviets' knowledge and understanding of one another may be seriously impaired unless attitudes are soon straightened out to conform to the demands of the present day.

"At Finland's highest political level and in its business circles they have a realistic impression of the Soviet Union. Others, however, are more or less guided by liturgical models. At the grass roots level I have had a chance to see how much more would have to take place for there to be genuine curiosity and a desire to look into things," Melanko said.

In his opinion, all parties should now critically evaluate our present way of operating -- the Finnish-Soviet Society and the Soviet Institute, which are going through a generation change, as well as, for example, the APN [Novosti Press Agency].

"Even the Finnish with which information on the Soviet Union is provided is not good Finnish. Nor is the content [of what they publish] able to compete with the other flood of information. For example, a citizenized youth who is

otherwise trained to react very critically to all kinds of propaganda instinctively rejects the essential information on the Soviet Union that is to be dug out from under the propaganda," Melanko said.

According to him, in the Soviet Union today they speak openly of faults too, although, like other nations, it has its own "strong taboos."

"If, for example, I were to translate into Finnish a few articles and comments from the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on thefts from chocolate factories as well as on leaking milk cans, in Finland I would certainly be accused of being anti-Soviet."

There are the names of nearly 170 scholars or people otherwise interested in our neighbor country on the Soviet Institute mailing list. About 30 of them met a week ago in Hauho. There they discussed the continuity of and changes in the neighborly relation between Finland and Russia and the Soviet Union.

A couple of years ago the institute published a report on the status of Soviet studies and the needs for improving on them in Finland. At that time they discovered that the image of Finland as a bridge between East and West -- a country that has a lot of knowledge of and experience with the Soviet Union and Soviet relations in general -- is in reality other than that.

They indeed ascertained that abundant information on Soviet relations as well as on agreement and negotiation techniques has been amassed by the national administration and business firms. However, basic research in the social sciences was inadequate and few people at the universities were interested in the Soviet Union. Only Russian history interested both scholars and students a bit more.

In the report they also verified the fact that in Finland none of the social science departments has any more than one or at most two high-level experts on Eastern Europe. There are no professor's chairs at all associated with the study of the socialist countries at Finnish universities.

Soon We Will Be Asking for the Names of the Responsible Ministers

According to director Waldemar Melanko, improving our proficiency in Russian is one of our most urgent tasks. Many others than he, however, fear that at the rate we are going proficiency in Russian as well as in French and Spanish is declining from what it was before in the schools. In 10 years time we may be asking for the names of the ministers and school officials who were responsible for this in 1985.

"There are 11 vacancies for scholars holding doctorates in Russian, only four of which have so far been competently filled. These people teach language and literature, but do not otherwise have time to add much in the way of understanding our neighbor country. In Denmark and Hungary this business is now organized so that Russian-Soviet history is taught and studied at the same institutions in which language instruction is given," Melanko said.

In Finland courses involving "familiarity with the country" intended for Russian-language students are generally only 20-to-30-hour courses. And even

then attention may be focused chiefly on so-called linguistic familiarity with the country and on the teaching of special terms.

In Finland the number of real Sovietologists can be counted on the fingers of two hands. Dissertations are being written and several of them have even been completed these past few years. Ilmari Susilo defended his doctoral thesis on the origin and development of systems theory in the Soviet Union, while Pekka Sutela did his on the school of optimal planning in Soviet economics and Jarmo Eronen his on the Soviet wood and paper pulp industry.

In Finland there are different kinds of information and knowledge scattered through businesses, the Economic Commission, the Bank of Finland and elsewhere. In Helsinki there is also an exceptionally extensive and diverse Slavic library which, however, chiefly foreign scholars make good use of.

"Now there is good reason for keeping two things separate: expository information and scientific research. So too, the status of Soviet research in Finland is quite a different matter from what impressions of the Soviet Union we in Finland have or what we know about it," Prof Osmo Jussila clarified the situation.

He is a historian who has tackled Russian history primarily through Finland, just as Profs Tuomo Polvinen or Keijo Korhonen have. They too have noticed how important it is to study Soviet history on the basis of local sources as well.

"Primary sources are important for a historian because published material is not enough," Osmo Jussila remarked.

Now that the fuss over his book dealing with the Terijoki government has subsided, he said that the storm was primarily directed at Finland's political life, not an individual scholar's problem. He would have liked to know what scholar would refuse to arrive at conclusions in his research which he suspects are unpleasant to some people.

"If I had written an article on the Terijoki problem in an English magazine, scarcely any discussion would have arisen. But since I wrote a popular book in Finnish, matters went as they did."

Osmo Jussila is at present writing an article in London on "the birth of Finnish national feeling as a background to the events that took place in Russia in the 19th century. He also said that he was reading a great deal of literature about what Stalin thought of Finland.

In Osmo Jussila's opinion, the younger generation should be involved in research on Russia and the Soviet Union in a key position, that is, through graduate seminars.

"Then students will be guided into orbit. Those who hold graduate seminars are, however, few in number and there are not many successors in the offing. Visits by foreign teachers might perhaps constitute a shot in the arm."

"When Ilmari Susiluoto's dissertation was published, the well-known English economist, Alec Nove, reviewed the work. He wrote that the English are not very familiar with such interesting Finnish research on the Soviet Union. Luckily for us, the author did not know that he had already familiarized himself with it," Osmo Jussila laughed.

Knows a Lot of Areas of Research for Young Scholars

Prof Tuomo Polvinen began his task, which has been going on for at least 5 years, by occupying himself with a biography of J.K. Paasikivi. The first part ends with the Tartu peace treaty, the second with the year 1944 and the third part extends as far as 1956.

"Here in Finland we still have very little historical research on the Soviet Union. Finland is a small country and we cannot have very many specialists in this field either, but we should certainly strengthen our general foundation in it," Tuomo Polvinen said.

He too knows of areas of research for young scholars. The entire autonomous period has not been studied from the standpoint of Russia and on the basis of Russian materials. According to him, Russia's so-called first revolution, from 1905 to 1907, and Finland's role in it await researchers.

"We must be able to study all topics -- the question is always how to study them and how to present the facts," he said.

Tuomo Polvinen attacked the Bobrikov study, which was conducted behind locked doors, since Bobrikov's personal diary was not given to Finnish scholars to examine.

In the opinion of scholar Jyrki Iivonen, we can learn to understand the Soviet Union better through scientific research. According to him, it is important to know about the country's Communist Party organs, organizations and other things, but a more profound familiarity with it is created with the aid of research.

"Why should we engage in research on the Soviet Union? In this way we here in Finland too would learn to better understand another society's 'language' -- its values, operating principles and ways of communicating. By studying it, we would learn to interpret this 'language,' which cannot be produced with the aid of a dictionary as a crude translation," Jyrki Iivonen said.

"The student of politics, of course, always runs into the problem of what is appropriate and what is not. A great deal is, however, resolved when the researcher sets out with an open frame of mind toward both his object of study and himself. We must also be able to study all subjects, the Terijoki government too."

In Jyrki's Iivonen's opinion, in both Finland and the Soviet Union there are sources and archives that remain closed to the scholar. In his opinion, these obstacles should be accepted as facts, but they should not be used as excuses for inferior research conclusions.

There is enough work for students of politics and economics as well as for two officials of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department of the Soviet section. All of the Soviet Union's internal political energy is now being used to prepare for the 27th party congress. In addition to the top leaders, many ministers will have to make way for new men and goals in both the machine industry and the construction industry.

Under the direction of bureau chief Charles Murto, four officials from the Socialist Countries Bureau of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department are also following constant changes. The bureau's assignments are divided as follows: the Soviet Union, the small Warsaw Pact countries and the other socialist countries. Embassy adviser Taisto Tolvanen, who has also served as interpreter for the president on visits of state, heads the Soviet Section. Tolvanen's assistant is Foreign Affairs Secretary Anneli Puura-Markala.

In the Foreign Ministry's Trade Policy Section, on the other hand, they handle questions involving trade. Ilmari Susiluoto, whose knowledge of affairs can, according to Charles Murto, also be utilized if necessary in the Political Section, is also a special investigator in the Trade Policy Section.

"In a small country job openings are few and it is uncommonly hard to get new ones. We, of course, to a great extent rely on our own foreign agencies," Charles Murto said.

Several Sovietologists wonder why, for example, the Foreign Ministry sends people who cannot speak Russian to our embassy in Moscow. Charles "mitted that he had heard this criticism.

"We cannot constantly send the same people to Moscow. I feel that it is understandable, at least in the early phase of their careers, for new people to get a chance to improve their knowledge of the language under ordinary, day-to-day conditions as well," he said.

While the President's Office has its own method of operating in the procurement of information on the Soviet Union, a very small number of people follow events in the Soviet Union independently of their daily routines. According to some scholars, in England, for example, some 20 people study events in the Soviet Union alone in the corresponding unit.

According to Pekka Sutela, an economic researcher who concentrates on Soviet affairs should not be offended by colleagues' doubts as to whether "P. Sutela is a real economist or not." He said that in the field of economics he does mostly service-oriented expository work, but little research. Pekka Sutela is writing a book on Soviet developments and economic policy during the past few years, even though his last book on the principles of the Soviet economy sold about 50 copies last year.

According to Pekka Sutela, young scholars do not seem to be emerging much in research on the socialist countries. According to him, the current generation

of students is under such pressure to perform that they are unwilling to study a language that is not in very widespread use.

At the present time Pekka Sutela wants most reliable statistical data on whether Soviet investments grew or declined during the latter half of the 1970's. These figures would make it easier to predict the evolution of the Soviet economy in the 1980's.

"In the 1970's the annual economic reports were noticeably thicker than in 1983, for example. Although some of the economic statistics were transferred to the republics' own annual economic reports, the new statistics are strikingly thin. Is this due to the fact that the results were not expected and that they did not want to present them given the present international climate?"

According to Pekka Sutela, there are a lot of projects for economic research and open questions "on the basis of national needs." According to him, we should know about changes in the Soviet production structure, fluctuations in the use of raw materials, etc.

Erkki Nironen, a special investigator of CEMA trade at the Lappeenranta Technical College, who is the only academic officeholder in this field in Finland, has an endless number of items to be added to Sutela's list of research projects. Only funds are scarce. According to him, however, the big exporters to the Soviet Union know their business, but even the medium-sized industrial firms need aid in the form of advice.

In addition to politics and the economy, other matters are of interest to Finnish scholars. For example, Soviet Institute researcher Seppo Lallukka is doing his dissertation on the Finno-Ugric peoples.

He said that he too was moving in a "very white, unexplored area," determining the areas inhabited by these five peoples, the linguistic processes and marital contacts.

Immutability and Conservatism Are Conspicuous

Prof Erkki Peuranen said that Finnish-Russian cultural relations have been quite little studied, chiefly the language and the literature. According to him, the question, for example, as to what Finns have known or wanted to know about Russia and the Soviet Union and what Russians have wanted to know about Finland has not yet been studied.

"The immutability and conservatism of impressions are conspicuous," he remarked.

It is hard for educated Soviets to believe that a modern European literature which can even have more general importance could come into being in Finland. They still for example, attach more credence to French or American literature.

"The list of Finnish best sellers from Pietari Paivarinta to Martti Larni is now attractive. The former has through Russian **translations** even influenced the birth of some new literary traditions like, for example, those of the Udmurts or Votyaks," Erkki Peuranen said.

"Larni, on the other hand, has strengthened the image of the quiet and silent Finn who, nevertheless, once he gets his mouth open, sounds off so loudly that everyone holds his sides laughing."

The character of the Finnish people and its image became established in the eyes of the Russians as early as the beginning of the last century. Many newspaper articles and folkloric and geographical descriptions reinforced it.

"Likewise, the impression that evolved during the last century of a Finnish provincial literature that was close to the land and critical of the society has been preserved in Russia right up to our day and the success of Finnish literature in the world has not to any extent worth mentioning influenced the decisions of present-day Russian publishers," Erkki Peuranen said.

He has a boundless unplowed field within his range of vision, the study of which is of primary importance to the molding of the image of our own culture too besides shaping Russians' image of Finland.

"For example, the dissertation on Pushkin's later lyric poetry which I published in 1978 was the first of its kind since 1913. The situation is, however, improving and in the near future we can expect several dissertations dealing with Russian literature."

Erkki Peuranen is himself wrestling with two major works. He is writing a biography of Pushkin and is compiling a history of Russian classical literature, the last one of which was published early this century.

"Finns have a tendency to be too cautious -- there is not an area of research about which we should remain silent. There is enough work to be done on the basis of literary values alone."

"If Russia is a Sphinx, as poets have said, so too are Finnish-Russian cultural relations. They have been studied too little. Could the reason be the Sphinx's threat to devour Oedipus if he did not find an acceptable answer to the Sphinx's question or have we taken pity on a Sphinx who dies when its riddle is solved?" Erkki Peuranen pondered.

11,466
CSO: 3617/7

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PRE-ELECTION PROBLEMS, BEHAVIOR OF PSF EXAMINED

Paris ETUDES in French Oct 85 pp 329-341

[Article by Colette Ysmal: "The Problems of a Party in Power: the Socialist Party on the Eve of Its Congress in Toulouse"]

[Text] The congress of the Socialist Party which will be held during the second week of October 1985 in Toulouse is of great importance for the party. In effect it will be necessary to review more than 4 years of governmental activity and, above all, to prepare for the elections of 1986. As of the end of this summer, just a few weeks before the congress and a few months before the elections (for the National Assembly and at the regional level), the least that we can say is that the PS is in a weak position or in a difficult situation. First of all, according to the most recent polls on voting intentions, if the legislative elections were to be held today, the party would only obtain 22 percent of the vote (total vote for the Left would be 34 percent). Even if we admit that intentions to vote are not real votes, there are some aspects which are more serious. At present the Socialist Party seems to be acting as if it had already lost the elections and as if the only problem was to limit the damage. Somewhat arbitrarily, the party has concluded that the number of deputies it will elect in the next National Assembly will be 170, its lowest score. Furthermore, no one sees how to come up with a real strategy for taking the offense. There is no capacity for mobilizing the voters to seek victory, however illusory that may seem now.

The Difficulties of a Party in Power

A first series of problems arises from the present state of the Socialist Party as an organization, that is, as an instrument for winning over and organizing public opinion. The victories achieved in May and June 1981 brought with them, as might have been foreseen, a flood of new members. At the time it was noted that the number of new members was, after all, rather small, in no way comparable, in any case, with what had happened in 1936 at the time of the Popular Front or in 1944-45 at the time of the liberation. The recruitment of new party members at the time it achieved power was rather small, reflecting what might have been expected, in the absence of a real mobilization of opinion flowing from a social movement. Furthermore, this influx of party members only amounted to a flash in the pan. In the absence

of precise data on the number of members and how many people have entered and left the party, we are reduced to making observations and collecting testimony which is necessarily limited. However, all observers agree in noting a decline in party membership and, even more serious, a profound crisis in the level of activity. The meetings of party sections take place at more and more rarely. Party members attend such meetings in fewer numbers. Party leaders at the departmental and national level and members of parliament are unanimous in recognizing that there is increasing difficulty in mobilizing party members for standard tasks (putting up posters, distributing pamphlets, selling party publications). In effect, the socialists have stayed away from the markets and streets of the cities where, prior to 1981, they were much in evidence.

Moreover, the dissatisfaction of those who have remained active and stayed in the party is clearly evident. A survey which we made at the time of the congress in Bourg-en-Bresse (in October 1983), among delegates to this meeting, that is, among the most militant people in the organization, showed that a substantial minority of those attending the congress (43 percent) considered that the work going on in party sections was not what they had expected when they entered the PS.¹ First of all, these party members criticized their party for its lack of organization and efficiency. Then they criticized the inadequacy of party work. Finally, they criticized the absence of political discussion. This last comment well illustrates, it seems to us, the major problem facing the Socialist Party today, which reflects at one and the same time the way in which it functions and its place in the French political system.

Little Internal Coherence

The question of how it functions internally overlaps that of democracy and the possibility--effective or not--of discussions between socialists who belong to different political "factions." Since 1981 the need to carry on the government has imposed a surface unanimity on the party which has resulted in particular in the adoption of consensus motions at the time of party congresses. Quite clearly, that has only hidden differences more or less temporarily. That has also prevented discussions on real problems. Furthermore, to the extent that this process of reaching unanimity is still going on, even in legitimate fashion,² under the aegis of the supporters of President Mitterrand, it has only strengthened the influence of this group. When other groups refused in 1981 and 1983 to be included in the discussions (the supporters of Michel Rocard) or agreed to participate (the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education] and the "new" supporters of Rocard) and then accepted motions which, in fact, reflected little of their views, the "minority" groups steadily gave ground to the other party members. As they were more and more persuaded that they held the full and complete version of the truth, the supporters of President Mitterrand have had a tendency, at all levels of the party, to display a certain dogmatism and to treat the others like bad socialists. In order not to be ignored, the minority groups, including both the Rocard supporters and CERES members, have developed a kind of siege mentality, most often making use of the national print or spoken media to make their point of view known.

The result of this is that it is more and more difficult to discuss questions within the Socialist Party and to work together, first of all as socialists and then as party members with varying opinions on different matters. The various elements which have contributed in the past to the rich fabric of the PS are now its Achilles heel, the more they are personalized around leaders suspected of having bad intentions and the more they have become fossilized. We say fossilized in this context, meaning that fidelity to a leader is an obstacle to an eventual reexamination of contemporary questions, in view of the stakes involved in the conduct of government.

The list of arguments developed by members of "Tendency A" of the PS to help their associates to find their way through the thicket of preparatory documents for the congress is a good example in this regard. According to what has been published in *LE MONDE*,³ irony and self-satisfaction is replacing the effort to analyze the situation. Thus, the contribution made by Michel Rocard is considered as only "revealing a strategy which is personal in character," to the extent that it "provides a caricature of the work of the government and of the party, underestimates the social and political tensions which have stirred up the Right, and is silent regarding the PCF [French Communist Party]." Pierre Mauroy and the CERES are not forgotten by this faction. The statement prepared by the former prime minister "too much resembles the work of a single man" who emphasizes his past efforts and follows "the dictates of fashion in linking the market and freedom." The reflections of the friends of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, for their part, constitute a "very weak contribution to the thought processes of the party" and reflect the internal condition of this current in the Socialist Party, which has "an internal problem of coherence, a difficulty in existing," and which is going through an "identity crisis."

In terms of polite comments, the other currents in the party, with the exception of the supporters of Rocard and those who support the "new" Rocard, have not been idle. Still quoting from *LE MONDE*,⁴ the supporters of Pierre Mauroy consider that the contribution made by Michel Rocard "contains within it the potential for abandoning many values of the Left in the name of telling the truth." For its part the CERES throws cold water on everyone. Lionel Jospin is called on to "do better," because his statement was not likely to provide dynamic leadership, to bring people along, or to clarify issues." Pierre Mauroy has produced a "smug overall view." Michel Rocard has made a "disappointing" contribution because he does not deal with the "international balance of forces" and leaves the party with no other choice than to "manage affairs on a day to day basis."

It will be said that this kind of presentation is common enough on the eve of each party congress and that, for the rest, it will not prevent agreement on common drafts of statements before or during the congress. No doubt this is true. However, apart from the fact that it does not necessarily provide a good image of internal party democracy, it makes public opinion aware of the essentially artificial and provisional character of the agreements which have been reached between people who previously had such poor opinions of each other and who stood for such unfortunate programs. It is not clear that speeches on internal party democracy (this is a party which ~~discusses~~

things.), will cancel the impression, in the eyes of the voters, of differences and splits between party leaders. All of that discourages party members. It is in the minority factions within the party (the supporters of Michel Rocard and the CERES) that the number of those leaving the PS and the decline in militant activity have been the most marked since 1981. However, it seems clear that the members of the basic units of the party are adopting a do nothing attitude in the face of the byzantine discussions carried on by their leaders, discussions whose importance they have difficulty in understanding and which end up with agreements at the summit of the various factions, whose logic they have difficulty in following. The range of the influence of the PS is itself affected by such developments.

What Is the PS Good For?

That brings us to the role of the Socialist Party in our political system and, more generally, in society since 1981, as well as the difficulties which it is encountering in preserving its identity separate from the government itself. Certainly, in the institutions of the Fifth Republic and even more in the system as it is employed by President Francois Mitterrand, it is nearly impossible for the PS to be anything other than the "amorphous party" which Jean-Pierre Chevenement urged it to be at the time of the congress in Valence in 1981. In fact, neither the party, nor even its parliamentary group, has been able to present really new ideas or political choices. Even worse, whenever there has been disagreement on some important questions--the generals of the OAS [Secret Army Organization] who committed crimes, the issue of the lay character of French society, and the definition of economic and social policy--to say nothing of the electoral law--it has been the government which has systematically won the day, whatever the feelings of party members, of party leaders, and of PS members of parliament, or at least some of them.

Without new initiatives to present, neither has the Socialist Party been able to be an effective transmission belt for representing government action to public opinion, and it has not known how to present, explain, and legitimize decisions taken at top levels of the government. No doubt that is a consequence of the apathy of its more militant members, of its internal differences, and of the reservations which certain members have had regarding the new course of economic and social policy. However, the PS and its leaders at the national level in particular have not been able to find a common denominator between the essentially good conscience it had during its first months in power and its practice of submitting to the harsh realities of government during times of crisis. The party has not known how to speak, either about itself or its adversaries. Its statements regarding the Right, in particular, have been and remain totally unrealistic. When the Right was taking over the theme of freedom, the government was denying that it had the right to play its role as an opposition force, accusing it of creating difficulties, of carrying on an anti-democratic struggle against the government and the Left. However, the party has been quite incapable of presenting a contrary view and opposing the viewpoint of the Right in any way other than condemning its campaigns for freedom and liberalism. More specifically regarding the development of "liberal ideology," we are still waiting for the PS to present a serious analysis containing the basic sources

of its positions (on the return of individualism), and even more the concrete and actual consequences for various social groups of the measures envisaged by the Right.

It follows that a number of militant party members (not to speak of public opinion more generally) are asking themselves today what the PS is good for. When Lionel Jospin claimed, in criticizing Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, that the party was keeping secret its conduct of the elections campaign, he was undoubtedly expressing the most profound feelings of party members. No doubt he would have made this view prevail if the party had not specifically, once again, backed off in the name of the kind of compromise which will probably be the characteristic feature of this entire period in government. There is hardly anything else left to militant party members than making a few gestures reflecting their dissatisfaction, providing evidence of their desire for more independence, such as refusing to accept leaders imposed on regional party organizations by the government in departments where they are unknown (the Delanoe affair in the Department of the Vaucluse, for example). This does not reflect an exaggerated attitude on the part of local party organizations. Rather, it amounts to a statement that, in the framework of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, the PS has not known how to carry out the responsibilities pertaining to the formation of a government majority. It has not known how to involve militant party members in government decisions already accepted by party leaders. However, let us recognize that it has not been helped by the practices followed by the president, who has finally been destroyed in his role as unquestioned and unquestionable leader holding government power, as his personality and working habits within the PS have been concerned with the possibilities provided by the respective government and party institutions.

What Political Program?

This failure, during the course of the present National Assembly, to assert its independence of the government has been reflected more explicitly in terms of the economic and social program which must be presented during the forthcoming elections campaign in order to win the elections, if possible. Or, if the elections must be lost, for the party to remain an important political force on the political scene. No doubt there is a certain amount of bad faith among those who say that the socialists have not done anything. The legislative record is not inconsiderable. However, it lacks a clear sense of direction, bearing in mind the programs advocated prior to 1981 which, more or less, and according to the socialists themselves, were to represent a French form of socialism or a third way between capitalism and communism.

A first question concerns the democratization of society. Neither the still incomplete program of decentralization, nor the Auroux laws, nor a broader program for the spread of culture, have had much impact. The program for self-administration, which perhaps is largely utopian, has completely disappeared from sight, and relations between government leaders and the people have handled, in effect, in the most traditional way of doing things. The prime minister and the chief of state have not resisted the temptation to use politics as a spectacle, which they handle well. However, this is a

perversion of democratic relationships. The trade unions, whenever there have been important choices to be made, have not been consulted when they could have been. Private associations have retained an attitude of suspicion, and the Greenpeace affair won't improve the situation. When asked about it, the French people have little impression that their situation has changed and that they have more power within society. The course of change, to the extent that change has occurred, has remained completely in the hands of the state, but it has hardly been included in the process of social dynamics. For the most part errors of judgment on the school problem or the print media have been cancelled out by the real achievements, as was the case with the development of the free radio stations.

Everything has happened, in fact, as if "the cultural program" had worn out, first in the face of the "disease of power" (gaining control of the state apparatus as such, the conviction of being the best) and then because of the needs of government administration. However, there have been such contradictions and hesitations! We will not enter into a debate on the need for the action taken during the first months in government in favor of the least favored members of society. However, we will remark that these people have had their living standards nibbled away by the logic of the austerity program. Above all, constrained and fenced in by circumstances, the socialists have had to undertake a policy whose "correctness" they now boast of, but which they rejected prior to 1981 and for which they did not prepare the French people who placed their confidence in them in 1981. It is in no way astonishing that the socialists have lost confidence in dealing with a dual failure: the first concerning the French people who expected both an expansion of their power and sound management of the economy, and the second concerning those who expected an improvement in their living standards, less unemployment, and the maintenance of their traditional outlook.

The whole problem now is to know how, on the occasion of its forthcoming congress, the PS is going to deal with these different challenges. The least that one can say is that the cultural prospects continue to be, whatever the sensitivities, totally beside the point. In the face of the offensive by the Right on the issue of freedom, the PS has nothing to say. Its most recent concern--reviewing the errors of Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1981--seems to be intended to justify its economic policy and to prove that it is fit to continue to govern after the elections of 1986.

In this regard, notwithstanding the agreements made by the Socialist Party Comite Directeur [Standing Committee] on 24 and 25 August,⁵ the four principal contributions which appeared in May 1985 at least have a common point of view. Compared to previous statements and particularly in terms of the Social Program of 1979, we may note a real change in language. All of the proposals now use the language of government, of responsibility and of the management of economic realities. It is indeed time for the majority of socialists to ask themselves how much time it is going to take to "break with capitalism." Now there is longer any question raised on this point, except the "challenge of modernization" raised by the supporters of President Mitterrand (in the statement of Lionel Jospin); what should have been done by the republicans at the beginning of the Third Republic; the "needs of economic management" (in

the statement by Pierre Mauroy); or the establishment of a "modern republic, which is nothing else than the marriage of the socialist program with the realities of the present period of history" (in the CERES statement). At the same time, a majority of socialists have discovered that social progress was not continuous and that the social classes which supported them had been entertaining contradictory expectations. Except perhaps in the CERES statement, this lesser form of faith in victory has also been marked by the manner in which world economic problems have been dealt with, or the crisis which affects all of the industrialized countries and the poorest countries even more. Although, before 1981, the socialists believed that they could deal with a crisis whose very existence they more or less denied, they later came to believe that a socialist France could more or less free itself from the world environment. Now they only talk of the relatively narrow room for maneuver and of the impact of the international situation.

Two Contradictory Visions

However, this kind of unanimity of view did not last long when it was necessary to draw the lessons from these changes in the overall socialist view and, more specifically, to explain to public opinion why they abandoned the economic policy of the first months in office and adopted successive austerity plans which only reflected the discovery of the laws governing the economic environment. The understanding reached between the supporters of Lionel Jospin, those of Pierre Mauroy, and those of the CERES, at the time of the August meeting of the Steering Committee, like the emergence of the "dissident" view held by Michel Rocard, revealed the existence of two contradictory visions of the future. The majority of the party chose to take it all in stride or acted as if continuity of policy would win out in the end. The supporters of Rocard urged the party to follow logic to its end and recognize that the party had basically changed and in the right direction. The former view emphasized the ideological purity of the party and treated the mishaps of government as a passing phase which did not affect in any way the correctness of eternal socialist principles. That was enough to please bewildered party militants. The latter view proposed that the PS carry out a doctrinal revolution which the German, Swedish, and Spanish socialists had previously completed, and which brought practice and theory into agreement. By following this course they expected to regain the support of public opinion, which they considered had been discouraged by the revolutionary drift of the party and by the conflict between the ill-considered promises made before 1981 and the realities of government.

We might ask ourselves which is the program more likely to mobilize the people. No doubt Michel Rocard was right to question a long standing attitude in the history of the socialist movement in France and which led to its deterioration: a revolutionary doctrine which has accommodated itself to the day to day conduct of government unrelated to the principles dearly defended in words. His own program is no doubt more coherent. However, we have the right to ask ourselves how socialist it is or what it proposes to do in terms of transforming social relationships. One might well admit that now is not the time for a definitive break with capitalism and even that such an effort involves more risks than advantages. However, we would like to know to what

extent the Rocard style of socialism, after it would become the law for the PS, following a French style congress of Bad Godesberg, would be different from what the PS did between 1982 and 1985 and what Raymond Barre did (or will do?). The recourse to the notion of socialist solidarity by itself cannot serve as a guarantee or as a protective screen.

The same ambiguity surrounds what threatens to be the principal question debated in the course of the elections of 1986: freedom or the role of the state. With the exception of the CERES, which has retained the model of state socialism, all of the other currents in the Socialist Party seem to have taken a backward step regarding state intervention in society. The agreement between the friends of Lionel Jospin, those of Pierre Mauroy, and those of Jean-Pierre Chevenement shows that this is not so simple. Certainly, we do not know as yet the text of the common statement that will be adopted by the "three tendencies." However, the agreement in itself proves that the supporters of Mitterrand and those of Mauroy are still closer to those who think that the state can and should do everything than to those who support the opposite position. In effect, we should not forget that the position which CERES supported before 1981 included a policy of national independence, growth and social democracy, conducted initially by the state, which should have "an overall industrial policy," a monetary policy, a policy for the division of government revenues, and a plan of economic restraint. Neither should we forget that this CERES position denounced any lessening of the role of the state as submission to "the dominant ideology" followed by the "forces in decline," meaning in this case the bourgeoisie who want to see the decline of France.

On the basis of the evidence such propositions are incompatible with the wishes of the government if they are not in accordance with the declaration of principles of the PS and its vision of a "Socialist Program." How is the PS going to deal with this contradiction and, furthermore, answer the concerns of public opinion as in the case of the campaign carried on by the Right? The supporters of Michel Rocard may well ask this question. However, the statement, according to which "state socialism has worn out its welcome and reached its limits," and the certainty that the market is, after all, not only the best regulator of the economy but, above all, the best guarantor of freedom, does not completely exhaust the subject. The disappearance of the concept of self-administration, replaced by the vague notion of "autonomy," may appear disturbing to the extent that the question of the limits on the powers of the people within society is no longer discussed or, if liberalism is considered the reigning doctrine, autonomy covers a certain scent of pure individualism. We expect that Michel Rocard will make clear what distinguishes him from Yves Cannac and from the most advanced of the supporters of Giscard d'Estaing and that he will explain how the autonomy of people in terms of a state which intervenes too much in their lives can be combined effectively with socialist solidarity and the interplay of social groups and other groups in defense of their interests.

We may ask ourselves whether the different factions within the PS are not victims of a dual error in the way they look at things. Everything is happening as if the majority factions of the PS continued to believe that the

French people expect everything from the state and that the claims for greater freedom are only the consequence of a malevolent campaign carried on by the Right. In this regard some Rocard supporters--with their eyes on the polls--are lending too complacent an ear to liberal activities. However, these polls, if they are looked at more closely, provide less evidence of increased support for liberalism than a traditional defiance of the state which, however, taking all social groups together, does not eliminate a more general demand for protection. Although it is true that, as a consequence of the excessively state-oriented view of policy held by the socialists, the French people desire to some extent to free themselves from state-directed constraints, they also want the question of the relationships between the public and the private sectors to be dealt with in a more elaborate and more serious way than the PS is presently doing.

A Fluid Strategy

Embarrassed because of its various political programs, the Socialist Party is no less so in terms of its strategy, an embarrassment which clearly shows the beginning of the dispute between Lionel Jospin and Laurent Fabius regarding the election campaign (which emerged in June 1985). In the absence of any prospect for a union of the Left and in view of an elections system which does not favor governmental alliances, the Socialist Party finds itself standing alone in trying to ensure a majority for the president of the republic. But which voters should be brought together? The program for a "Republican Front," which, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the prime minister, is aimed at "an opening to the center," which seeks to bring back the more moderate voters who have abandoned the Left since 1981. In fact the personalities or groups which could be invited to join in this "front" are not very numerous (a few former leaders of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party], certain ecologists, and Olivier Stirn), and their ability to attract the support of the voters should not be overestimated. However, they could give the PS a certain image and establish in the eyes of the voters the strategy of the prime minister: "remove the passion" from the political debate, emphasize management rather than ideology, and be serious in handling daily economic and social problems.

By claiming, on the contrary, that the PS retains its identity, Lionel Jospin is defending quite a different strategy, which consists in giving priority to addressing the "people of the Left." This is what he is explaining when he says that it "is necessary first to bring our own people together before winning over others." In other words, the elections campaign of the PS, as it is inseparable from its political program, is aimed at socialist voters and consists of meeting their specific expectations. The first secretary of the party recognizes that that will not be enough. However, the other aspect of his program involves "maintaining an alternative for communist voters" other than the one the PCF [French Communist Party] is offering them. It seems that the PCF has renounced for some time to come assuming the responsibilities of government.⁶ It may be thought that a number of communist voters are not prepared to apply the policy of the worst case by giving the Right the control of the government. Now the ability of the PS to attract

these communist voters is based on its being solidly anchored to the Left and its really maintaining a socialist identity.

The ultimate purpose of the course recommended by Lionel Jospin and his supporters is perhaps to strengthen the vote of the PS as such. The problem with this view is that it does not increase the overall vote of the Left and, under present conditions, would turn the government over to the opposition. In other words, the PS is faced with having to square the circle. How can it take the offensive to keep those voters who still continued to vote for the Left during recent elections, while winning back those lost since 1981? None of the solutions presented up to now appears really satisfactory. The approval given by the French people to Laurent Fabius does not seem to have changed anything in terms of the forthcoming elections. The Left has topped out at about 35 percent of the votes, and the Right will have 65 percent, if the polls are to be believed, while partial, local elections confirm the decline in the credibility of the Left and of the PS in particular. We do not know whether the electric shock offered by Michel Rocard--a change in party doctrine--would change the situation.

We need to have a clearer view of what the Socialist Party will do in the period after 1986. No doubt the decision of the president of the republic to complete his term and to "cohabit" with the winners in the legislative elections, whoever they may be, will not make things easier. However, it is hardly possible that the PS would go into the elections without letting it be known whether, in case of defeat, it would go into the opposition or if it would govern in coalition with the Right. And, if this is its decision, under what conditions. It seems that the majority tendency within the PS is driving the party toward going into the opposition. However, the role of the president of the republic himself and the risks in an elections system which could produce a National Assembly without a clear majority make it impossible to reject in principle an alliance of the socialists and at least part of the Right. What would be the criteria for such an alliance? By refusing to raise this question, although the Rocard supporters do so, the PS risks giving the impression that it is prepared to return to the dangerous game of the parliamentary understandings of the past, which neither party militants nor the voters were able to control in advance. Since, more or less under constraint and forced by circumstances, the party accepted the electoral law introducing proportional representation, let it be at least explicit about its future alliances. It is not enough--and the history of the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International, the former name of the PS] proves this abundantly--either to say that you are of the Left, or to state that your party is anchored to the Left, or to have a "revolutionary" program to resist the poisons of the Third Force. In the last analysis an alliance around the center may be necessary. It would be enough to say so to the voters, both in terms of the possibility and its limits.

This last-mentioned ambiguity reflects, in fact, all of the difficulties which the Socialist Party has had to face during its period in power. Ah, but everything was simple when it was in the opposition! The 5 years in government have transformed a party sure of itself, in a conquering mood, a well-tuned instrument for mobilizing public opinion and achieving power, into

an organization in search of its identity and looking for a program to achieve. No doubt not everything is negative, if you credit the party with having discovered economic realities. However, we may regret that the PS--and also the government, for that matter--has allowed itself to be so completely circumscribed by these "realities" and has proved itself incapable of presenting a coherent, political program. The final blow will perhaps come from the electoral law, which deprives the party of a strategy of power and drives it on to float at the mercy of circumstances

FOOTNOTES

1. Colette Ysmal and Roland Cayrol, "Militants socialistes: le pouvoir use" [Socialist Militants: Power Wears Them Out], PROJET, No 91, January and February 1985.
2. Legitimately, to the extent that the motions receive a majority of the votes by party members.
3. 19 June 1985.
4. 26 June 1985.
5. Let us recall the preparatory procedure for a Socialist Party congress. The various factions or personalities present papers to contribute to the debate, which are published in a party organ (in this case LE POING ET LA ROSE) of May 1985. At its 24-25 August session the Standing Committee tried to reach agreement on a combined text, reflecting the various positions expressed. An agreement was reached covering the contributions made in the name of the "Mitterrand supporters" by Lionel Jospin and those made by Pierre Mauroy and CERES. On the other hand Michel Rocard did not agree with this draft and was backed up by the "new supporters of Rocard," whose leaders are Marie-Noel Lienemann, Alain Richard, and Jean-Pierre Worms. Therefore, there will be two contributions presented to the congress, initially submitted for the consideration and vote of party sections and departmental organizations, and then provided to the delegates to the congress. It is at Toulouse that the Committee on Resolutions will consider the possibility of reaching an agreement between the supporters of the two drafts. Meanwhile, this procedure will enable Michel Rocard's supporters to count up the number of those backing him. In terms of the combined resolution by supporters of Lionel Jospin, Pierre Mauroy, and CERES, the contribution of each will be negotiated among the various but allied factions.
6. On the evolution in the viewpoint of the PCF, see Georges Lavau, "Le parti communiste français apres le XXVe Congrès" [The French Communist Party Since the XXV Party Congress], ETUDES, May 1985, pp 613-621.

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CSO: 3519/26

POLITICAL

ITALY

CRAXI ADDRESSES LOWER HOUSE ON PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 7 Nov 85 pp 1-3

[Prime Minister Bettino Craxi 6 November Confidence Debate Speech to Lower House: "Building a Just Peace in the Middle East"]

[Text] Mr President, honorable colleagues, at the conclusion of the debate of the past few days I return to thank all those who expressed their appreciation, in full or in part, of the line of conduct that the government has followed in the difficult matter of the Italian ship Achille Lauro. I would also like to express my thanks to all those who, while stating reservations, expressing disagreement, and pointing to gaps in the conduct of the government's foreign policy, nonetheless demonstrate that they share and value its basic objectives, which are peaceful and which we pursue while developing Italy's international role.

Naturally, when we engage in a foreign policy debate there always comes up a question of principle and general balanced approach as to the best way to fulfill our alliances, a principle that no one in this Parliament disputes, whether it concerns the European Community or the Atlantic Alliance. Any alliance or treaty that is so binding, like the Community agreements, for example, involves rights and duties, and there is no doubt that we try to live up to both, fulfilling the duties and benefiting from our rights, in the context of alliances that involve commitments, but within which it is necessary that all the members conduct themselves by observing a relationship of mutual respect and preservation of mutual dignity.

It is no coincidence that in presenting an account to Parliament, an account which moreover could not fail to coincide with the terms of the clarification issued among the parties after the state of crisis had been overcome, I have put at the beginning a presentation, although still limited, of the issues relating to disarmament and to a thorny question, which is part of them, the problem of the American Strategic Defense Initiative.

I would like to return quickly to this point, stating first of all that the government has not intended and does not intend to hide anything from the Parliament, that the government is ready to undertake the meetings considered necessary to provide all information about the situation, just as has happened thus far. It is a dynamic situation, however, I have stated, and confirm, that before taking committing decisions for our country the matter will be submitted for review and judgment by the Parliament.

We tackled an issue of this kind on the basis of a consideration that I affirmed in my initial statements and that I reaffirm, that we had concluded that the two major conferring parties, the Americans and the Soviets, had mutually decided to include in one of the three topic baskets at the basis of the Geneva negotiations the subject of space research, thus including the substantial U.S. program. From that we deduced a predisposition of both parties to negotiate the issue. This is what we said to the Soviet leaders in Moscow, when we took up the question and encountered a position that gave the appearance of decision in advance: that either America gave up this program or everything would inevitably be back to square one. We persisted by saying that all this broke the logical progression of the agreement on the three baskets, since they should have declared themselves prepared to discuss the issue, having accepted it as a basis of discussion for the Geneva negotiation.

In talking with the Americans, we presented from the first an argument that in my judgment is the central one in this difference. That is, that one cannot envisage the United States being able, through its research (even if this research achieved the planned result, which is not certain), to achieve a result of military use that could lead to developing a defense system of such range and capability as to negate the nuclear potential of the opponent, while leaving intact its own nuclear potential. This would mean an upsetting of the general strategic balances and would signify aiming at a position of military supremacy that the other side could not accept. Thus, it would inevitably unleash a race for possible or imaginable countermeasures, which had in any case already been threatened by the Soviet Union.

The American reply has been given several times. However, I would like to cite only the conclusion I drew from the words of the President of the United States during the meeting in New York and which seems to me quite indicative. At the general meeting two simple arguments were presented: the United States maintains that if the research actually achieved results enabling construction of such an antiatomic space shield, this space shield would have to be available to all. One party could not have a monopoly of it.

Reagan gave me the example of the gas mask. He recalled that gas shells were invented during World War I, and the gas mask was invented. Everyone had a gas mask. In this era we invented the atomic bomb, the nuclear era: if a defensive setup can be found that would negate the atomic bomb's destructive potential, then everyone should have it.

Reagan then presented another argument, even more convincing. He said that if someone thought he could have a monopoly of such a possible defense instrument, it would create a dangerous situation for peace in the world, because it would risk provoking a preemptive nuclear war. For example, he expressed the conviction that no one could passively stand by in face of a U.S. attempt to gain a position of supremacy in Italy.

My answer, on that occasion, was that I could end up being convinced of that line of argument, which appeared clear, however that the problem was to convince the Soviets and not us of the possibility that the issue in question could be negotiated with a system of guarantees such as to effectively achieve

the desired result, that is, a complex of defensive systems that would radically change the relationship of offensive means to defensive means, in a general, guaranteed strategic balance.

On the other hand, as regards the problems that within a few days will be the subject of negotiations in Geneva, during the meetings between the President of the United States and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, I would like to give the Parliament some further information, recalling that the Italian Government had received with favor the latest Soviet initiatives and singled out the most significant aspect of the reduction proposals, certainly greater in degree than the past, in nuclear weapons. When on 10 October we met with Nitze, the special White House adviser, in Rome, it represented an opportunity for us to recognize the dynamic elements, at least on the side of the proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev, and we encouraged presentation of valid counterproposals. We repeated this position directly to President Reagan on 25 October in New York, and during that very meeting he himself gave advanced announcement of such counterproposals.

Cautious Predictions Regarding the Geneva Meeting

Without revealing the content and complete formulation of the proposals put forward by the United States at Geneva, of which President Reagan informed me by personal message (I believe that I cannot reveal them to you, lest we see them printed tomorrow morning in some American paper), and pending preliminary analysis of them, I think that I can nevertheless indicate some significant points.

Above all, it seems to me important to stress that these proposals have accommodated in their quantitative parameters the reduction proposals put forward by the Soviets in respect to strategic issues. This applies both for reduction of overall launch systems, amounting to 50 percent, and for limitation of nuclear warheads, which both countries propose to establish at a maximum level of 6,000 units, with "subceilings" for the various missile components on which there remain evaluation differences.

The American side, in response to the Soviet Union's call for reduction of the number and power of land-based ICBM's, has offered to redimension its own program for deployment of ALCM's (i.e. cruise missiles launched from planes), which is at a much more advanced stage than the Soviet program. The American willingness to carry out reductions in this area appears very significant to me. The United States has also offered as a matching step to limit the number of strategic bombers, to a greater degree than proposed in the START negotiating position.

On intermediate nuclear weapons, the latest American proposals clarify and define the position already previously announced, proposing an agreed regional limitation for Europe, and leaving undefined the overall ceiling to be agreed on.

These are the prior measures so that Geneva meeting will not fail. I am making cautious predictions. I do not at all take for granted that there will be an agreement. I would regard a breakup as harmful, yes. I believe that the meeting will already have achieved a major result if it actually opens a

period of dialogue, establishes a different atmosphere, of greater trust--greater mutual trust--and begins to influence in a beneficial way the development of international relations. And this even if the concrete results prove to be limited.

In short, I hope that the way will be found to put a hood on the "hawks" and the "hawklets," who are indeed scattered through the opposing structures, Atlantic and Soviet.

Our own position has to be very open, very alert, and one of decisively encouraging dialogue. When the Soviet Union, as has happened in the past, assumes an aggressive, closed and hard position, which tends to divide the West and the Europeans and to create destabilizing effects, it is countered with a position of great firmness. If the Soviet Union is open to dialogue and shows itself interested in it, such dialogue must be encouraged. Perhaps it is worth making one observation: nothing in the world is unchanging. Within a closed system, historically regarded as monolithic and by its nature bureaucratic, such as the Soviet system, there is emerging in the leadership and in power a new generation, which probably has reforming intentions and the will for internal change (and even says so). In what direction and how is difficult to say; certainly it needs, and cannot but be strongly interested in, a long period of peace. If it is true that such interest exists, we also have this interest, as does the West: that of better organizing the peace, better guaranteeing it, and insuring it for an indefinite period.

In this direction, we hope that the occasion of Geneva will not be lightly wasted, nor that it will slip on some banana peel of a petty spy war.

Italian Interests in Mediterranean Area

Well, the role that Italy intends to play in the context of the Mediterranean area has--I believe--been made clear. One of the topics dealt with in New York related to management of world crises. It is true that President Reagan made a list of the crises: somewhat different than the list we might have prepared ourselves. The world crises are--alas--much more numerous than listed by the U.S. President in New York. Nevertheless, it is important to deduce what among these things the major powers will resume talking about or begin to talk about. And this not because we perceive a world subject to a dual, mutually agreeing domain: indeed we maintain that a bipolar system of world government is unacceptable for the majority of countries, beginning with the European. However, it is very important that direct discussion be initiated on some of the most delicate and difficult crisis points.

We, and not only we, have persisted in reminding that in the regional crises other countries have a role to play, have specific interests to defend, have important relations to develop, and have influence to exert. That applies also to Italy: in the Mediterranean region, where we have a presence, interests to defend and a future prospect, hence a voice to exercise. We orient this role of Italy in the Mediterranean along the axis of a more general policy that must be Euro-Arab-African. It is not only Italy that has obligations toward this arc of the world, but all of Europe.

I have read some frankly strange statements in this connection. I have been asked peremptorily why we concern ourselves with the Arab countries and pay such attention to their confrontations. What do we have to say to each other? I was asked this by noted intellectuals, my foot. What do we have to say to each other? Oil is more difficult to sell than to buy.

Servello (MSI) [Italian Social Movement]: We would like to know the name.

Tremaglia (MSI): Whose foot?

Craxi: This is an old expression that has not yet disappeared; I believe it dates from some previous century.

In this connection, even if we want to look only at the commercial aspect of the issue, people are forgetting that almost 14 percent of our exports go to the Arab states as a whole. In other words, we are talking about a level of exports significantly higher than goes to the United States, and that now represents one-third of our exports to the European Community. In an exporting country like ours, 14 percent is already an essential factor for the system of economic and trade relations.

We have to take this into consideration, as well as the fact that it is happening during a phase of declining trade relations and in a Middle East situation of closed and semi-closed markets as a result of conflict or war conditions.

Thus, there is an important and real interest--no longer theoretical--in a peaceful situation, so as to better develop cooperation with these countries, and economic and trade relations, their development and ours.

Italy, a great exporting country, is basically rooted in the European economic reality, but without its projections into these various areas of the world it would absolutely not be in a position to guarantee development balances in its own economy or future prospects.

Thus, we are not talking about ideological or sentimental whims, more or less prompted by--shall we say--secondary motives.

At any rate, in this region we have worked, and are trying to work, for peace, and the most delicate, ancient, oldest, fatiguing, and dangerous crisis is still in this Middle East area, the Arab-Israeli crisis.

I have listened very attentively to the debate that has taken place, just as we have heard others. In some way we must succeed in making clear the principles of this discussion, among us and among the political forces, because otherwise the polemics will resume. Any fact and any interpretation will be enough to arouse a polemic if--I repeat--we do not somehow succeed in clarifying the principles.

If a difficulty--let us say--of interpretation of an event and a foreign policy action concerning the Middle East has caused perplexity within the majority and has caused a crisis--let us say--of clarification, this means that if we do not get to the bottom of principles the danger of the crisis will remain behind the corner once a month, regarding a topic that is so

thorny and involving such intricate, tumultuous and difficult events, from which it is difficult to stay aloof.

Thus, we have to clarify the principles.

We Have Worked and Are Working for Peace

The decisions relating to a solution of the Middle East question do not come from Rome. We have clarified, however, that during the course of this year we have had a special responsibility in that Italy has had its turn at presidency of the European Community, and there was a turning to Rome since at that moment we were representing Europe; and it was to there that many of the protagonists of this issue turned. However, we must--and I repeat--clarify the principles. Does this Palestinian people exist or does it not? The case arises in the world reality of people of various nationalities coming together and organizing a single state. There have emerged states representing many nationalities over the course of the centuries and even in current times. Can it be resolved if there exists, as there does exist, a Palestinian national issue in the context of the Jewish state? It does not seem possible, it does not seem acceptable to any one. Thus, there exists this national question, that is, the aspiration of a people to have a homeland, a land, and institutions. Therefore, in respect to a national question and the problem of a national claim, does Italy, which is the youngest nation in Europe, have a position of its own; a position favorable or opposed to the national claim of a people that does exist, though dispersed? Does it have a favorable or an opposed position?

Naturally, there are the legitimate rights of Israel, which is a sovereign state; rights that must be guaranteed.

Capanna (DP) [Proletarian Democratic Party]: Tell them to establish the borders of that state! (Comments from the center).

Chairman: Honorable Capanna, I beg of you!

Voice from the right: Shut up, Palestinian!

Craxi: Legitimate rights that must be guaranteed.

Capanna: Is it true or not? Find out!

Craxi: Then one must establish what are illegitimate positions that must be removed.

Honorable colleagues, when years back Israel was threatened in its very existence by a war waged against it by its neighboring Arab states, all together, we were for Israel, to defend its right to existence. Israel won that war and is today the dominant military power in the region, enjoying a military supremacy that all the surrounding states recognize as a fact. No one threatens it, and no one could have the military force to threaten the existence and security of the State of Israel.

Pajetta: Sometimes they suffer from it.

Craxi: At any rate, for 18 years Israel has occupied Arab territories, inhabited by Arab population.

Capanna: Finally we agree! (Comments from the center.)

Briccola (DC) [Christian Democratic Party]: He is still back in the Trojan War. Shut up in the horse! (Protests by Deputy Pollice, DP.)

Chairman: Honorable colleagues, please.

Briccola (DC): Come out of the horse!

Chairman: I urge you to continue, Honorable Prime Minister.

Craxi: Good. Has for 18 years been occupying Arab territories, inhabited by Arab population.

We believe that it should restore these territories in exchange for peace, negotiating this restoration. This is the essential course; all the rest is really peripheral, all the rest is really secondary. This is the essential course: it is a river that has to be crossed.

Interruption by Deputy Cristiana Muscardini Palli (MSI).

Well, if the Palestinian national question exists, if it has a basis, and if the Palestinians have the right to a national claim, the PLO's action must be judged by a certain measure, the measure of history.

You see, I dispute the PLO's use of armed struggle not because I maintain that it does not have the right, but because I am convinced that armed struggle will not lead to any solution.

Study of the confrontation shows that armed struggle and terrorism will only cause innocent victims, and will not resolve the Palestinian problem. However, I do not dispute the legitimacy of recourse to armed struggle, which is a different thing. (Vigorous protest from Deputy Giorgio La Malfa. Comments on the extreme left. Appeals by the chairman.)

Pollice (DP): See how heated up he is getting?

Chairman: Honorable colleagues, please!

Craxi: When Giuseppe Mazzini, in his solitude, in his exile, was consuming himself with the ideal of humanity and was desperate as to how to confront the ruling power, he, such a noble, religious and idealistic man, envisaged, outlined and planned political assassinations. This is the truth of history.

Interruption by Deputy Mario Pachetti (PCI) [Italian Communist Party].

Legitimate Rights of Israel and Those of the PLO

And to dispute the legitimacy of resorting to arms by a movement seeking to liberate its own country from a foreign occupation means going against the laws of history.

Applause from the Socialist deputies.

I say one thing, I say that the PLO...

Loud applause on the extreme left, by the deputies of the independent Left, and by the Socialist deputies. Protests on the right.

Berselli (MSI): That's the new majority!

Chairman: Honorable colleague! Honorable Berselli, please. Honorable Berselli. Honorable Berselli, the prime minister has the right to speak (vigorous comments on the right).

Craxi: You are disputing what is not disputed in the UN Charter of Human Rights: that a national movement defending a national cause can resort to armed struggle.

Baghino (MSI): To assassinate innocent people!

Craxi: But stop! Let me speak. Enough now! (Noise on the right--remarks.)

Chairman: Honorable Baghino! (Interruption by Deputy Berselli). Honorable Berselli, I call you to order! Honorable Berselli, I call you to order! Honorable colleague, sit down. Honorable Tremaglia, you too! You will be able to speak.

You will speak at voting time. Now, the prime minister has the right to speak and to say what he wants to say. (Repeated protests on the right.)

Craxi: I think, I have always thought, on numerous occasions I have tried to convince our Palestinian contacts...

Tassi (MSI): You don't even convince your own.

Craxi: Would you be quiet? That is enough! (Loud, repeated protests on the right). Enough! (Repeated, prolonged protests on the right.) Enough.

On numerous occasions we have tried to convince our Palestinian contacts that the path of violence, terrorism and armed struggle is a vicious circle; that along this road no solution will open up to the Palestinian problem. We have persisted in order to get a positive response.

The reason why we included a kind of warning in the document agreed on among the parties is that we have seen revived after the Israeli raid on Tunis, in a certain sense also understandable, the threat of a resumption of armed struggle that we regard as in contradiction to the possibility of participating in a negotiation process.

Hence the warning that we included, which is good sense, a piece of advice, a way of realistically viewing the situation. If the PLO resumes the armed struggle, even only in the occupied territory, or only against noncivilian targets, this will interrupt the process of creation of possible or eventual conditions for promoting the negotiation prospect. Hence the urgent invitation to what we have persistently, despite all, been awaiting in the peaceful and negotiation arena, in the context of the Middle East situation, and the only course that can make possible the finding of a solution.

I do not believe in the possibility of easy solutions; I do not believe in them at all. I only hope that there does not occur a phase that prepares the worst, that is, a phase of resumption of terrorism and consequently of increased tension and a breakup among the states of the region.

In any case, let us do what we can do, that is, help the processes of peace, we will do this with balance, seeking to understand the point of view and the interests of all the forces in the field; trying to understand the various positions, including those who have religions, traditions and cultures very distant from us and that so often make it difficult for us to understand their behavior. Nevertheless, we must try to understand the concrete nature of the various requirements that are on the table. I do not understand such hatred toward the weaker party in the contest, the one that is hence more subject to errors.

Continuity of Italian Foreign Policy

However, one cannot demand that a political organization that is undertaking the political representation of this cause be eliminated in midstream! With whom would one deal after that, the village pharmacist in Transjordan? Whom should the powers then deal with? Why this hatred to weaken or destroy a political representation, even though it has committed a long string of errors, no doubt about it...

Tassi (MSI): And also crimes!

Craxi: Certainly, also crimes! However, everyone will repeat his own histories! We will repeat our own histories, and judge the others with greater generosity! (Applause on the left.) Israel should also do this.

Israel, which is our friend, should be more generous in the dealings with the Palestinians, because Israel knows how much hard effort and how much sacrifice was required to win a state: now it must be generous with the defeated. And help toward solving the Palestinian issue. We ask this of a friendly state: to be farsighted and generous (applause on the left and the extreme left.)

Yet I did not invent this Italian position in contacts with the PLO, honorable colleagues, it has existed since 1974, when a PLO delegation was received at the Foreign Ministry. Then, contacts increased with the fourth Moro government, with the president on rotation of the European Community, and with the Italian chairman of the United Nations, which increased Italy's need for more frequent exchanges of views.

At the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, the head of the PLO political department, Qaddoumi, was received at the Foreign Ministry. In 1977, this same Qaddoumi had high-level meetings in Cairo and New York with the then foreign minister, Forlani; there followed other meetings, always at high level, and on 26 September 1979 Foreign Minister Malfatti, speaking to the UN General Assembly, defined for the first time in a specific way the Italian position on the Palestinian problem and the role of the PLO.

He said in particular: "The hoped for peaceful settlement can only come about if the basic principles of Security Council resolutions 242 and 238 are applied by all the parties involved in the negotiations in achieving an overall solution. This applies equally to the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, which Italy has for some time recognized as a political force representative of the Palestinian people."

The Italian position was soon accepted by the European partners, followed by the Venice declaration of 13 June 1980, which affirmed: "The Palestinian issue is not a simple problem of refugees: it must finally be solved. The Palestinian people must be given the capability, through an appropriate process defined in the context of an overall peace settlement, to fully exercise their right to self-determination."

The same concepts were confirmed in the program statements of the second Spadolini government presented to the Chamber on 30 August 1982, in which was also expressed the commitment of the Italian Government "to undertake, also in concert with the Community partners, every opportune direct initiative to promote negotiation among the parties involved and to promote reciprocal, unequivocal and simultaneous recognition of the PLO and the State of Israel, also in anticipation of Italian official recognition of the PLO."

In March of the same year, Qaddoumi met with the then foreign minister, Colombo, and subsequently Arafat with the president of the Republic, the Pope, and some others (comments).

This is the history of the relations between the PLO and Italy. As you see, not a new development.

We will try to work in a balanced way to promote the action of all those, in all camps, in the Arab states as well as in Israel, and in the Palestinian movement (in its turn, greatly divided), who seek to move in the direction of peaceful solutions, through the opening up of prospects. Because the problem is not one of reaching agreements, it is one of opening prospects that with time can be pursued and ultimately lead, with patience and caution, to definite agreements that will be lasting and satisfactory to all.

Honorable colleagues, the majority has been reconstituted after resolving its difficulties (comments on the right and the extreme left).

Tremaglia (MSI): So we have seen!

Pollice (DP): That's a fine remark!

Craxi: Once on paper, peasant can relax! (Comments.)

It was obviously not one of those final, irreversible crises. A crisis is always by nature negative, however in this case it was certainly not an incurable affliction but rather one that was cured rapidly because everyone had the intention to arrive at a clarification. There were clarifications that were regarded as adequate.

This does not mean that viewpoints were given up on specific facts or on circumstances that had caused a disagreement. That people decided to carry the disagreement to its maximum expression, to its maximum level, I do not dispute, I say that once things had been evaluated, we found a point of equilibrium, as we had the duty to do. We did not follow what was good advice, and that the radicals had given from the start, probably foreseeing what later happened.

Correct Relations Between Government and Opposition

I cannot tell you, Honorable Natta, whether this is a postponement of the crisis. As things stand, I would say no, because the agreement is expressed in a different way, and the clause is specific, as is the will behind it. Reasons for crisis may emerge again, though I hope not again on a topic like this. I hope that this is not the case, I wish that this will not be the case. And yet events will tell us exactly how things stand.

During the course of this matter there reemerged the ghost of the anticipated elections. I grabbed this by the horns from the start, saying that I was resolutely opposed to a prospect of this kind, and that it seemed to me in these circumstances, in a political system like ours (which produces a good deal of irrationality), that this would be the height of irrationality: to establish a situation that could descend unawares into paralysis, into inability to produce a solution. And then to go before the voters to say I don't know what: to talk about finding Abu Abbas? I really do not know what we would have said to the voters!

I believe, therefore, that the idea of elections was clearly absurd. Instead, we had to do what we did: carry out a responsible reevaluation.

We reminded all those with responsibility of the fact that the country wants political responsibility and does not fail to indicate this, even in loud ways; a desire for political stability; public opinion has found the way to say, to point out to the government its desire that the government continue. In any case, it would be a difficult task to identify alternative overall policies, and moreover there was a reminder of this yesterday by the secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, De Mita, when he advised against destroying what already exists, when the alternatives are not clear.

Surprise was caused by what I said at the end of my comments the other day, honorable colleagues: I am very surprised at the surprise, because I had made in July, to the House of Deputies, an observation that I repeated during the consultations and definitely believe to be useful. It is this: the central phase of the legislature (which we prepare to enter) can be better used, before the tensions, nervousness, and democratic conflict of an approaching election take possession of us. I agree with the DC secretary when he reminds

that there should not be a confusion of role between the majority and the opposition, and in this respect it appears to me that the honorable Natta is very firm (and rightly so), as well as others who declare, on the right or other positions in Parliament, their opposition: to the majority and to the opposition each their responsibilities!

However, I was referring to another problem: as you well know, a large backlog has built up of important laws that have been awaited for some time by the country, the concerned sectors of the country; there are laws of particular social, economic and institutional importance, and the delay involves months and years, and not 2 weeks...

Pochetti (PCI): The majority is to blame!

Craxi: As for the 2-week delay, I will certainly never blame on the opposition a delay due to a crisis in the majority, which is pressing and has pressed during the useful time to avoid the temporary authority. However, there are in fact on the table a large number of laws, important ones, that have gathered dust.

Then there is an institutional matter that had been, let us put it this way, inflated, regarding which we should get together to decide to do nothing, or to do little or very little, or to do at least enough to be respected and regarded seriously by a country that wants a more efficient system of democracy than ours.

Finally, there is the urgent issue of the financial law and the budget, and the prospect of getting into the temporary budget authority. I have not raised any other problems than those I have stated; it is always a little annoying to be charged with motives that one does not have. I have not raised the issue of changing the alliances. I have raised the problem of the responsibility of a Parliament that does not operate in watertight compartments, or should not operate in watertight compartments, and where the dialectic and behavior reflect the logic of the democratic life.

I have not asked the Communist Party to vote the finance bill; heaven forbid.

Antoni (PCI): Yet!

Pochetti (PCI): We will not do so!

Craxi: I have not asked you to vote for the finance bill. The issue I raised was to see whether there exists a possibility, in that in the previous years everyone expressed an institutional interest and gave significant institutional emphasis to the idea of meeting the deadlines for approval of the finance bill and the budget, of avoiding the temporary exercise, solving the issue, and how, through a broader parliamentary cooperation that might in fact be achieved through evaluation of possible coming together on points of dispute that under the existing state of affairs had appeared rigidly far and remote. If this is possible, fine; if not it is not possible, we will take note.

The government is prepared to examine everyone's proposals, as long as they are such as not to divert the course of a restoration of health that is necessary, not through homage to an ideological dogma, but homage to the most practical, concrete and obvious interest of the country.

It is true that I have referred again in particular, and will do so again tomorrow, to the communist opposition, because it already realized, in 1983 and 1984, the importance of the deadline for approving the budget, and for which reason--if my memory is not short--it gave in the past other evidences of responsibility by even joining in a government majority.

What I have asked and what I have offered, naturally, is considerably less, and simply reflects a political institutional logic that emphasizes the level of responsibility of the political forces toward the general interests.

Honorable colleagues, there is an image of Italy that has grown in prestige and international esteem. This can be deduced from what is written about our country round the world, both in the East and in the West. Honorable colleagues, there is a hope and a need for progress that motivates particularly the new generations in school and at work that must not be disillusioned and this can be avoided. The democratic political world must succeed in fulfilling, in a more effective, constructive, and foresighted manner, its role of orienting and guiding. The government has a high responsibility, but a very high responsibility is held by the Parliament, on which the government depends and to which it appeals for renewed trust (applause from the deputies of the DC, Socialist, Social Democratic, and Liberal groups).

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

CENTER PARTY CONFERENCE REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR COALITION

Conservative Leader Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Einar Solvoll: "Syse Says Center Party Will Hardly Share the Fate of the Liberal Party--the Coalition Will Hold"]

[Text] "Center Party people are sensible, and I am convinced that they will remain with nonsocialist government cooperation. They also know from having witnessed the experience of the Liberal Party's fate that supporting the Labor Party will mean that they will just become wallflowers." This was how the Conservative Party's new parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse responded to the statement by former prime minister Odvar Nordli about future coalition cooperation between the Center Party and the Labor Party at the Conservative Party strategy conference at Kaldbakken yesterday afternoon.

About relations with the Progressive Party, Syse said that this party will also be drawn into conversations on policy and the economy on a level with the leaders of SV [Socialist Left] and the Labor Party--provided that Karl I. Hagen is willing to meet, he added.

All of the new Conservative Party Storting group, all the Conservative Party cabinet ministers and most undersecretaries and personal secretaries took part in a daylong strategy conference at Kaldbakken in Oslo yesterday. Among other things, it was discussed how the coalition parties would meet the opposition, mainly the Labor and Progressive Parties, in the debate on the speech from the throne in the Storting on the first two days of next week. During the entire debate there was nobody who expressed fear that the coalition cooperation would not hold, as the leaders of the opposition parties have predicted a number of times following the election over a month ago.

Wilcock on the Labor Party

Prime Minister Kare Wilcock opened the debate, and attacked the statement by Labor Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland that it will be the responsibility

of the government to appropriate funds for the proposals which the opposition will try to get a majority for in the Storting, at the same time as she said that the Labor Party no longer wanted to take over government power as long as there is a nonsocialist majority in the Storting.

"A surprising declaration," said Prime Minister Kare Willoch about Gro Harlem Brundtland's statement that if the Labor Party together with SV and the Progressive Party succeeds in bringing down the government, it is not the duty of the Labor Party to form a new government.

"It is easy to understand the unwillingness of the leader of the Labor Party to take responsibility for the damage if her own proposal is approved. But if she feels that way, she should stop raising the stakes instead of running away from the responsibility if they are approved," said Prime Minister Willoch.

Conservative parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse followed up and said that if there is a majority in the Storting favoring inflationary policies, that majority must also accept responsibility for the inflation.

Progressive and Labor Parties

About relations with the Progressive Party, Syse said, "We will conduct ourselves toward the Progressive Party in the Storting in the same way as Labor Party governments had to take into account that on many issues they were dependent on wing parties. In other words: cooperation from issue to issue, when it is obviously necessary to have conversations to avoid situations becoming worse unnecessarily.

"In any case this government must not fall because of formalities, quibbling or lack of common sense. The people would not understand that," said Syse, who recalled that Hagen had put more spirit in the Storting through appointments such as positions in committees which the parties were not strictly entitled to due to their strength.

"But the Progressive Party can not count on any special rights in the forming of government policies. They are firm as they have been formed by the three parties which make up the coalition. Even though the Progressive Party must be counted in the nonsocialist majority, it is not a coalition partner," said the Conservative parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse.

Center Chairman on Goals

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland: "Center Party Pressure for Fixed Care Wage"]

[Text] The Center Party will press to get a law on the right to a care wage when the issue comes under considera-

tion by the government--probably in the spring of 1986. Minister Johan J. Jakobsen, leader of the party, made that announcement during the meeting of the party directors at Gjovik yesterday. Jakobsen maintained that former Prime Minister Odvar Nordli's desire for cooperation between the Labor Party and the Center Party is not realistic for the Center Party.

"We feel a strong obligation to follow up the party's program and central objective of a care wage," emphasized Jakobsen. He denied that the proposal was a "flighty idea" which was conceived in the election campaign. The party leader pointed to the party's working platform where it states that the Center Party favors "a care wage for people who have responsibility for care and maintenance of ill, elderly or handicapped persons in the home." According to the program, the wage would be ensured through the municipal home help arrangements in the individual municipalities.

"It is the Center Party's view that such a wage can only be ensured by legislating the right to a care wage, and in line with our central program we are proposing that in connection with the new social law, which is being worked on," said Jakobsen. He said that the law, following an extensive round of hearings, will be dealt with in the government, probably in the spring of next year.

Jakobsen was "pleased with the strong growth" in the health and social sector. But he acknowledged that there still remains much to be done in this area.

Labor Party-Center Party

The leader of the Center Party believes that Odvar Nordli's statement about cooperation between the Labor Party and the Center Party is primarily an admission by the Labor Party that it cannot come into the governing role again without cooperating with other parties. Furthermore Jakobsen believes that NATO supporter Nordli also sees danger in cooperation between the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party.

Progressive Party

"With a Progressive Party which has a clear need to distinguish itself, and a somewhat aggressive Labor Party it is obvious that there could easily be difficult political situations in the Storting," said Jakobsen. He pointed out that if the two parties combine to "undermine the stability of our economy" they will not be able to avoid the political responsibility for that.

"The government is, however, open for budget adjustments which do not undermine the foundation of continued moderate price and cost increases," said Center Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen.

Leaders Issue Program

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "Center Party View: The Three of Us Or the Labor Party"]

[Text] Gjovik, 19 October. The leadership of the Center Party is firmly convinced that the only alternative to the existing coalition government is a minority government of the Labor Party. A "Center government" is not feasible, maintained the party chairman, Minister Johan J. Jakobsen after the 2-day directors' meeting in Gjovik. On the other hand the directors advocated adding to the national budget, especially in the area of energy savings.

After Odvar Nordli's invitation to the Center Party and Gro Harlem Brundtland's assertion that it is not certain that the Labor Party will take over if the Willoch government falls, Jakobsen had a "strong requirement to make it crystal clear" that in such a situation the Labor Party must take responsibility for the government. The party's parliamentary leader, Johan Buttedahl, said it is natural according to parliamentary rules. He said that the statement by the Labor Party leader raised doubts about the Labor Party's credibility.

In reply to the question from the local press whether the Christian People's Party and the Center Party could form a government alone if the Labor Party avoided the responsibility, Jakobsen maintained that was not currently feasible. In reality there are only two alternatives: the existing coalition government or a purely Labor Party government. Jakobsen reminded that in the election campaign the Center Party invited the voters to support the party as a part of a three-party government, and during the national directors' meeting there was never a suggestion of any other arrangement.

Talk With Progressive Party

Johan Buttedahl confirmed that there are only differences in nuance between the government parties on the question of how relations should be with the Progressive Party. Hagen does not want special treatment. All the opposition parties want to be oriented on the government's policies if it proves to be necessary, he maintained, and emphasized that it is usual procedure in the Storting.

Although Minister Johan J. Jakobsen called the national budget proposal too expansive, the party's national directors have submitted an augmenting proposal in the form of a resolution. Led by Buttedahl who wants "refining of a good budget," the national directors are asking for an increase to the district building funds and for cultural purposes. When it comes to the plan for energy savings (ENOK), "the national directors require that appropriations for ENOK in the budget be sharply increased."

The national directors accepted most of the increase in expenditures, including that for health purposes, and called it the "Center profile." In a commentary Jakobsen maintained that the budget proposal represented the focal point in the Storting, and that it is the basis for a broad political solution. "The budget should also be satisfactory to the Labor Party," he said. But to the question of what will be cut down in response to the directors demand for "revised priorities and adjustments," he had to admit that no such instruction had been issued.

Care Wage

The party's main issue in the election campaign, the demand for a legislated care wage, was followed up by the national directors, who requested the government to work on the right to a relief and care wage in the new bill for a social law which is expected to be presented to the Storting next spring. The party vice chairperson, Anne Enger Lahnstein, emphasized that there are great expectations for that in the entire party.

In a third statement the national directors expressed their consternation about the execution of Benjamin Moloise, and demanded that the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa be reinforced on the Norwegian side. In that connection the party referred to the measures taken in the Storting last spring, and demanded that they be placed into effect.

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CSO: 3639/24

POLITICAL

NORWAY

JAN SYSE DISCUSSED AS LIKELY SUCCESSOR IF WILLOCH GOES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Oct 85 p 6

[Commentary by Ole Ask]

[Text] Jan P. Syse is now the strong man of the Conservative Party. If the party needs him, he could appear as chairman at the party congress in April of next year. If Willoch falls victim to one of his own moves or that of someone else in one of the many cabinet questions, Jan P. Syse will be among the strongest candidates to take over from him.

Prime Minister Kare Willoch weakened his position during the recent Address Debate. Erling Norvik gave himself notice last spring. Now parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse is the party's strong man. He has strengthened his position with extreme rapidity, since he came to parliament reluctantly only a few months ago to assume leadership of the parliamentary group.

"If I were asked today, I would say no." This was his categorical answer when ARBEIDERBLADET asked him if he would become chairman after Erling Norvik.

A survey taken some time ago by ARBEIDERBLADET among local Conservative Party organizations showed that Syse was extremely popular. Many doubted, however, that he could combine the positions of party chairman and parliamentary leader. It has been no more than 2 years since Jo Benkow was "relieved" of the one post. It was argued that the two positions were too demanding. In addition, Conservative Party headquarters does not wish to share the chairman with the parliamentary group. Party insiders do not rule out the possibility that Syse could be pressed into service as party chairman, but his reluctance is well known.

Skauge Wants Job

The only person who has clearly stated his desire to be chairman is under-secretary Arne Skauge. This fall he will probably be back in parliament. Many of the challengers among Skauge's own generation have backed out. This is true of Kaci Kulman Five, Per-Kristian Foss, and Wenche Frogner Sellaeg. Thus, only three real candidates remain: Syse, Skauge, and Rolf Presthus. Many Conservatives believe, however, that Willoch wants to hold on to Presthus a while longer. The strong Oslo domination of the party leadership has been

criticized for a long time. This is one of the strong arguments in favor of Arne Skauge of Bergen, in addition to the fact that he would bring a new generation of leadership to the position.

Since the Address Debate, more and more people have been asking: When will the Willoch government step down? Speculation concerning possible successors is already underway. If Willoch falls victim to one of his own moves during this fall's budget debate, many believe that Jo Benkow could be a candidate. That would give the prime minister the opportunity to retreat to the position of parliamentary president. That presupposes, however, that the present coalition would continue or that the Conservative Party would form a government on its own. Benkow could be a stabilizing interlude.

But both Rolf Presthus and Jan P. Syse would also be extremely strong candidates to take over after Willoch. In addition, they both know that it is unnecessary to take the long route, via the chairman's post at Conservative Party headquarters, in order to succeed Willoch in a given situation. Regardless of who takes over at Conservative headquarters, many party members believe that as long as Syse is in parliament, all other candidates must step aside.

9336
CSO: 3639/29

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LABOR PARTY POSTS EIGHT YEAR RECORD IN POLL FIGURES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Oct 85 p 6

[Article: "Best Labor Poll In 8 Years"]

[Text] The Labor Party must look back almost 8 years to find better poll results than the party received in the Norges Markedsdata (NMD) barometer for September. The Conservatives retained the support they received in the parliamentary elections, but both middle parties lost ground. One Center Party voter in seven has turned his back on the party since the elections.

If elections were held today, there would be a clear socialist majority in parliament--51.1 percent against 47.5 percent. The Labor Party has now achieved a figure of 41.5 percent. This is a 0.8-percent increase since the parliamentary elections.

SV (Socialist Left Party) has also advanced since the elections. It has gone from 5.5 percent to 6.4 percent, while the Liberals have remained constant at just over 3 percent.

The Conservatives are holding the line at 30.4 percent. The Center Party has dropped back down to the same poor showing as last spring. Its figure was 1.1 percent lower than in the elections--a drop from 6.6 percent to 5.5 percent. This means that the party has lost one voter in seven since the elections.

The Christian People's Party also suffered a decline--from 8.3 to 7.6 percent. The Progressive Party, on the other hand, rose slightly, by 0.3 percent, and has now reached 4.0 percent.

NMD - Politisk barometer september 1985

1) Fylkes stings- valg Sept. 1983	2) Stor- tings- valg Sept. 1985													
	Sept. 1984	Okt. 1984	Nov. 1984	Des. 1984	Jan. 1985	Febr. 1985	Mars 1985	April 1985	Mai 1985	Juni 1985	Aug. 1985	Sept. 1985		
SV 3)	5.3	5.4	6.0	5.1	5.8	5.3	5.2	4.6	5.1	5.3	5.4	5.8	5.5	6.4
A 4)	38.9	39.9	39.9	39.8	39.4	38.4	39.2	38.2	39.7	38.7	38.5	40.8	41.5	
V 5)	4.4	4.5	3.4	3.7	4.4	3.7	4.2	3.6	3.5	4.5	3.7	3.5	3.1	3.2
SUM 6)	48.6	49.8	49.3	48.4	48.8	48.4	47.8	47.4	46.8	49.5	47.8	47.8	49.4	51.1
S 7)	7.2	5.6	5.1	6.0	6.6	6.2	5.2	6.1	6.4	5.3	6.0	6.8	6.6	5.5
KRF 8)	8.8	8.9	8.5	8.8	8.2	8.4	8.5	8.3	7.7	8.4	8.5	8.1	8.3	7.6
H 9)	26.4	29.1	28.5	29.4	29.2	29.1	28.7	30.8	31.0	29.9	30.1	30.0	30.4	30.1
FRP 10)	6.3	5.7	8.4	5.9	5.4	6.5	6.9	5.5	5.8	4.9	5.3	5.4	3.7	4.0
SUM 11)	48.7	49.3	48.5	49.9	49.4	50.2	49.3	50.7	50.9	48.5	49.9	50.1	49.0	47.5
DLF 11)	0.7	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5
RV 12)	1.2	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.5	1.1	0.8	1.2	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.6
NKP 13)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1
ANDRE 14)	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2
TOTAL	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.1
Antall svaret partivalg 15)	1023	1065	1094	1007	1020	1046	1056	1037	984	1024	1052			
Antall intervju i alt over 18 år 16)	1288	1288	1323	1252	1253	1278	1255	1262	1216	1263	1263			

Barometret fremkommer ved utvalgskorreksjon i henhold til siste stortingsvalg
Beregnete statistiske feilmarginer kan være av en størrelsesorden på opp til 3%-enheter for stemmeandeler over 50%.
Ca. 2%-enheter for andeler på 10-20 og ned mot 1%-enhets for lavere stemmeandeler.
Intervjuarbeidet er utført i perioden 23. september - 11. oktober 1985.

NORGES MARKEDS DATA A/S

Key to table:

1. Parliamentary elections, September 1983
2. Parliamentary elections, September 1985
3. Socialist Left Party
4. Labor Party
5. Liberal Party
6. Subtotal
7. Center Party
8. Christian People's Party
9. Conservative Party

10. Progressive Party
11. Liberal People's Party
12. Red Election Alliance
13. Norwegian Communist Party
14. Others
15. Number indicating a party preference
16. Total number over 18 years of age interviewed
17. Barometer figures are corrected on the basis of results from the last parliamentary elections.
The estimated statistical error is on the order of 3 percentage points for figures near 50 percent.
The error is about 2 percentage points for results of 10 to 20 percent and about 1 percentage point for lower results.
The interviews were conducted between 23 September and 11 October 1985.
NORGES MARKEDSDATA A/S.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

STUDY INDICATES CONSERVATIVES WON YOUTH VOTE IN ELECTION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Oct 85 p 7

[Article by Alf Hildrum]

[Text] The Conservative Party was more successful than the Labor Party in the fall elections among voters under 40 years of age. This was indicated by an election survey taken on election day by the Central Bureau of Statistics. According to the survey, the Conservative Party received a whopping 35 percent of the votes in the 25 to 29 year age group, 32 percent of the very youngest voters, and 34 percent of voters in their thirties.

The corresponding figures for the Labor Party were 29, 32, and 31 percent. The survey gave the Labor Party a total of just 38.4 percent, compared to 40.4 percent in the election results. This means the party is somewhat under-represented in the figures for the youngest voters, but this does not change the main conclusion: The bastion of Conservative voter support is comprised of voters under 40 years of age.

On the other hand, the survey showed that the Labor Party enjoys extremely solid support among older voters, with 42 to 43 percent of the votes. The Christian People's Party also received most of its support from older voters, with 15 percent of the votes from voters over 60 years of age. The Progressive Party and the Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, are typical youth parties, with 7 and 8 percent of the vote in the 18 to 30 year age group, respectively. One consolation for Odd Einar Dorum was that 8 percent of the voters in their thirties voted for the Liberal Party.

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POLITICAL

PORUGAL

EMERGENCE OF NEW PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE COSTA BRAS

Background, Ambitions Evaluated

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Dinis de Abreu: "The Military Candidate"]

[Text] Less than a year ago, in an interview with this newspaper, Colonel Costa Bras said, we quote: "I do not have any political ambitions;" adding modestly, "I am more interested in being useful and doing something I like." Asked on that same occasion (at the end of February) about the possibility of becoming a candidate for the presidency of the republic, he replied negatively, reaffirming only: "At this moment, I am the high commissioner against corruption and I will exercise those duties as long as I see that that task is useful and I feel sufficiently good about exercising them. I am not thinking of anything else."

Whether he was thinking of something else or not, only he knows. What is certain, however, is that this week Costa Bras publicly confirmed his availability to become a candidate for the presidency, as we had predicted. Since it is not admissible that he would do it merely out of "usefulness," a keyword that the still high commissioner likes to inject into his speech, one may presume that his detachment regarding political life has changed.

To be truthful, the lack of political ambitions maintained at the beginning of the year seems to us to be irreconcilable with his availability as a candidate for the presidency of the republic, the more so since there was still much to be expected from his action in the High Commission Against Corruption in a country in which the paid favor and the parallel market have gained a sad citizenship.

A discreet personality, not much given to interviews--his press coverage is quite meager--Costa Bras always knew how to safeguard himself even at the most critical times, although he did not hide being in the midst of events. He was one of the architects of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), drafting the first "Captains' Manifesto" together with Melo Antunes. He was a member of the Group of Nine, and in the public service area, he was minister of internal administration, the first purveyor of justice, administrator of the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Plant, and finally high commissioner against corruption.

These are items that appear in any biography but which are appropriate to recall because of the significance they assume when one is assessing the personality of the first military man, meriting assessment, who appears resolved to intervene in the process of election of the future president of the republic.

It is as necessary to observe Costa Bras' political-military career as it is his careful human relationship. In 1976 he did not hesitate to criticize Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's conduct at the same time that he confessed his friendship and even admiration for Major Sanches Osorio despite considering him a convinced conservative, and a strange paternalism for Dinis de Almeida ("a chap who is a little excitable and whom few know intimately").

The explanation for such a "plural" attitude on the part of Costa Bras may possibly be found in a statement found in the files: "We military men have a common bond that is very difficult to destroy." The bumpy revolutionary course demonstrated that that was so. Beyond the ideological divisions, there is the circumstance of being military and that has transcended the memory of confrontations and some excesses. The military "family" has done everything to rehabilitate those who for one reason or another "fell out of grace" or were bypassed by events.

Costa Bras' virtue was in having perceived quite early what should be his place in the history of the movement and, later, in the government and public life in general. He made an effort to retain bridges to the right and to the left without ever abandoning a measured distance. Prudent in his contacts, he is not known to be guilty of any great inconsistencies; nor would it be easy to accuse him of deep contradictions.

It might even be said that his discourse is so rigidly the same that in 10 years no appreciable deviations are detected from a calculated line of thought and deliberate modesty. If some months ago Costa Bras appeared to be stripped of ambition and concerned simply about the "usefulness" of his service, going back a decade ago we discover this same passage: "I have the ambition to be useful to my country but it is up to others to assess the usefulness of my contribution."

We must conclude, therefore, that someone succeeded in convincing Costa Bras of the "usefulness" of presenting himself to the voters as a candidate for the presidency. It is not difficult to guess where the initiative came from.

A Changed Picture

In confirming his availability, Costa Bras considerably changes the panel of candidates. It is not a matter of simply another candidate but of someone who at the outset has strong possibilities of discussing the move to the second round, since it is unlikely that the electorate will make the definitive choice in the first round.

Eanes clearly intends to "impose" the name of Costa Bras on the Democratic Reform Party (PRD) and should it encounter some resistance among the

sympathizers of Lourdes Pintasilgo's candidacy (Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos, for example, was one of MAD's [Movement for the Study of Democracy] driving forces), his wishes will prevail. This means that the PRD does not have the slightest autonomy of choice, much as Lourdes Pintasilgo may declare that she has 80 percent of the "Eanist" electorate.

Costa Bras' public statement means, moreover, that he obtained sure guarantees, without which he would not have dared to expose himself. In the meantime, it would not be surprising if the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) should appear alongside the PRD, as we acknowledged last week, although it may designate a symbolic candidate simply to benefit from the "Radio-TV Time." Was it not Alvaro Cunhal who, on different occasions, when asked about possible support for Lourdes Pintasilgo invariably replied that the list of candidates was not yet complete, indicating that, without prejudice to his sympathy for the former prime minister, "another" might appear?

In fact, Costa Bras never antagonized the PCP, although he had criticized the action of the communists, specifically in 1975. Note this excerpt of an interview that he granted that year: "While considering a Portuguese Communist Party as a necessary agent for our socialist life, I regard the PCP and some forces that support it or that it supports as disruptive of domestic political life because of its dogmatism, inflexibility and thirst for power at any cost."

The leader of the PCP has not changed and the party's strategy has limited itself to evolving according to the new situations. But Costa Bras cannot be accused, on the left, of having attempted to sidetrack the PCP nor, on the right, of not having criticized it; a balance that few can boast of...

Now, if the virtual candidate of the PCP drops out on the threshold of the elections in favor of Costa Bras, the latter can hope to add the 18 percent of the PRD to the 15 percent of the communists. In arithmetic logic, he will thus gain a percentage of votes that will insure his moving into the second round.

Nevertheless, the candidate will not have easy going, because of the dispute with Lourdes Pintasilgo, who will feel "wounded" by this choice on the part of Eanes, of whom she continues to be an advisor, by the way.

In the statements she made this week as well as in the interview she granted to the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, Lourdes Pintasilgo did not disguise her aversion to the possibility of a military candidacy. "It would be odd at this stage," she told us, "for Portugal to seek a military man for president of the republic, because of his characteristic as a military man."

The whole interview, furthermore, faithfully reveals Lourdes Pintasilgo's state of mind, which compares the continuity of a military man in the presidency with the typical situation of the Third World and does not hesitate to stress, with relation to the president of the republic: "(...) and I do not believe that General Ramalho Eanes would betray his independence and impartiality vis-a-vis the electorate. I do not believe his is capable of betraying the very rules of the republic, in which there are no heirs or regents designating their successor."

It is acknowledged that Lourdes Pintasilgo could not be more explicit. And this raises a deep-rooted doubt regarding Costa Bras: will he, alone and by himself, be capable of competing with the other candidates for the presidency?

It is unlikely that the presidential election campaign will follow the model of the legislative elections. That is, one cannot easily conceive of "Radio-TV Time" presenting Costa Bras "with Eanes" off-the-cuff, much less that the candidate would travel around the country accompanied by Manuela Eanes.

On the other hand, will it be ethically and morally understandable for Eanes to address the country and expressly recommend voting for Costa Bras?

The PRD emerged from a position of semi-anonymity to a comfortable place in parliament, thanks in part to the personal diligence of Manuela Eanes and the punishment that the electorate wanted to mete out to the current political leadership of the Socialist Party (PS). But does Costa Bras have the means of making himself a sufficiently well-known personality in 3 months without Eanes' sponsorship?

The first reactions are symptomatic of the fact that the "imposition" of a military man in the presidency is not going to be done without arousing wide controversy. The manifesto of a group of intellectuals, common to the three civilian candidacies, is already an indication. It is not likely that Lourdes Pintasilgo will drop out in favor of Soares (as has already been sounded out) without undertaking a strong crusade against the retention of military men in the presidency. Even though they are more detached from that debate, Freitas do Amaral and Soares will have reasons to second her.

Even in the reserve, Costa Bras continues to be a military man. The PRD will soon be headed by a military man, even though in civilian status. Little by little, even though out of uniform, the military men are returning to the area of power.

Let no one doubt: the presidential elections will be a fundamental test.

Probable Eanes Support

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 19 Oct 85 pp 1, 24

[Text] Colonel Costa Bras' statement of availability to become a candidate for the presidency of the republic, released on Thursday, had been arranged with General Ramalho Eanes the day before. As a matter of fact, on midday Wednesday, when Eanes was lunching with his personal advisers and members of the PRD, Jose Rabaca and Miguel Caetano, Costa Bras went quickly to the presidential palace where he remained for about 20 minutes to settle with the president the final details of the statement released the following day, in which he said he was "seriously considering my availability to become a candidate in a strictly above-party and independent framework." Contacted by EXPRESSO, the presidential palace admitted that the talk between Eanes and Costa Bras had been much more conclusive than those the president had had with other military men who had announced to him their intention of becoming candidates.

Early in the week, on Monday, Eanes and Costa Bras had had a longer talk in which the candidacy was agreed upon. Furthermore, the two had already talked about the matter for an hour and a half on the Thursday prior to the legislative elections (3 October), when the current political picture was different. That first time, the president of the republic reportedly suggested--less diligently, then--to Costa Bras that he personally evaluate the support he might be able to count on.

After that, directly or through the mediation of friends and collaborators, Costa Bras contacted members of various political areas, having even gone to the home of Eurico de Melo in the north, where he remained for about 5 hours.

This week, he informed Almeida Santos of his definite intention to become a candidate. In the meantime, he reportedly received the information from the communist area that the PCP would look with favor on his candidacy, especially if it should have the support of Ramalho Eanes.

But in the contacts he had in the last few days, Costa Bras had used the name of the president of the republic, giving to understand that he had his support. And although this support had never been confirmed by the presidential palace, the news finally became public.

The PRD Political Committee met on Thursday to analyze Costa Bras' statement, still without any concrete indication on the matter from Eanes. Nevertheless, the Eanists reportedly expressed themselves in favor of the prospect.

At the same time, a presidential palace source revealed to us that Ramalho Eanes plans to become more closely associated with the PRD, initiating regular meetings with the Permanent Committee of the new party. This idea coincides with his intention to exert himself on behalf of Costa Bras' candidacy, mobilizing the whole party for the election campaign.

It should be recalled that Manuel da Costa Bras, who is close to 50, was appointed by Mario Soares in December 1983 as high commissioner against corruption, a position in which he carried out what was generally considered too unobtrusive an activity. He had already occupied second place in the hierarchy of the Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo government in the capacity of assistant minister to the then prime minister and head of the Ministry of Internal Administration.

An active participant in the 25 April Movement and in the drafting of the armed forces program, he was Prime Minister Palma Carlos' military aide. In the first and second provisional governments, he held the position of minister of internal administration, which he would reassume in the first Mario Soares government. In 1976, he would be named the first Portuguese superintendent of justice. Between 1979 and 1981, he was in the administration of Cahora Bassa, going afterwards into the private sector, in the Lídio Monteiro Company, at the same time that he went into the reserve.

Pintasilgo Avoids Political Talk

In the meantime, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, who could be the principal one hurt by Costa Bras' advance, has avoided talking about the political situation and the presidential candidacies with this former collaborator of hers. An informant close to Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo told us that various urgent requests had been received from members of the Costa Bras candidacy seeking contacts, which were never held because the Pintasilgo leaders alleged unavailability.

Nevertheless, Pintasilgo agreed to a talk with Costa Bras which she termed to be "of an exclusively personal nature" about 2 weeks ago.

A presidential palace informant confided to us at the same time that Costa Bras would try to get Pintasilgo to talk to Eanes, probably to pressure her to drop her candidacy. Meanwhile, the former prime minister does not appear to be disposed to make any concessions in that area, the more so since she hopes to use the votes she may receive as her own political capital for a movement to be organized in the future, in case of defeat. However, a source close to Costa Bras assured us that his candidate will not propose such a meeting to Maria de Lourdes.

In the meantime, a leader of the Pintasilgo candidacy made it a point to stress to us that she "accepts without any reservations the correlation of forces that has emerged from the 6 October elections," adding further that "the Cavaco Silva government, if it is accepted by the president of the republic, is a legitimate government and should have an opportunity to govern."

The same source revealed to us that the organization to be formed by the former prime minister in case she is defeated may retain a designation very similar to the present movement supporting her election, which is called "MAE [expansion unknown] of Lourdes Pintasilgo,"

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

FIRST POST-ELECTION POLL SHOWS CONTINUED GAINS BY LIBERALS

Liberals Largest Nonsocialist Party

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Nov 85 p 20

[Article by TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA: "SIFO Investigation Shows Liberal Party Larger Than Conservative"]

[Text] According to SIFO's [Swedish Institute of Public Public Opinion Research] latest election barometer, made 7 weeks after the election, the Liberal Party is now the largest nonsocialist party. The party received 23.5 percent which is the highest figure since SIFO began its polls.

The investigation, which was published in four morning newspapers, also shows a nonsocialist majority with 50.5 percent compared with the socialist bloc's 47.5.

Center Party Goes Backward

The Center Party continued its retreat, and the party is now at 6.5 percent. (8 with the votes of the Christian Democrats). The party has never had so few sympathizers in a SIFO poll before.

In the October poll 2,249 people were asked which is the best party. The figures for each party were (figures from August/September poll within parens): Conservative Party 19 (27.5); Liberal Party 23.5 (10.5); Center Party 8 (11.5) including Christian Democratic Party 1.5 (1.5); Social Democratic Party 43 (44.5); Communist Left Party 4.5 (4.5); Other parties 2 (1.5). Those who did not indicate a preference 4.4 (4.5).

Not Comparable

The SIFO figures are not directly comparable with the 15 September election results which were Conservatives 21.3; Liberals 14.2; Center 12.4; Social Democrats 44.7; and Communist Left 5.4.

Westerberg Discounts Results

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Nov 85 p 20

[Article by TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA: "Bengt Westerberg: Nothing Has Happened"]

[Text] Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg takes the latest SIFO poll with a grain of salt. The poll gives the Liberal Party 23.5 percent in the election barometer.

"If it is true, half a million people regret their votes of 15 September and now prefer the Liberal Party. That does not seem reasonable.

"One must distinguish between an election and an opinion poll. What is reflected is only that the Liberal Party has attracted a lot of attention after its election success, but politically nothing has actually happened." Westerberg is aware that his party's policies will now receive much closer scrutiny.

Conservatives' Deputy Tobisson Comments

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Nov 85 p 20

[Article by TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA: "Lars Tobisson: Situation Unstable"]

[Text] "What is noteworthy about the political situation is that it is not stable." That is the conclusion reached by the Conservatives' first vice chairman, Lars Tobisson, about SIFO's latest election barometer.

"Actually the abrupt change in the poll does not correspond to any changes in the programs of the parties," said Lars Tobisson.

"Now the Liberal Party may expect the same scrutiny of their policies that they escaped before." About the result of the election barometer, Tobisson confirmed that it was a tendency from the last week before the election and on election day which is continuing--the winner continues his advance for a time after the election, and the loser continues his decline.

"It is the same after every election," said Tobisson.

Greater Scrutiny of Liberals

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Nov 85 p 20

[Article by TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA: "Birgit Friggebo: Our Policy Tolerates Scrutiny"]

[Text] "Liberal Party proposals are going to be exposed to closer scrutiny now, since the other parties do not

want to permit us further successes." That was the opinion of the Liberal Party's first vice chairman, Birgit Friggebo. She said that her party is "well equipped" to tolerate scrutiny.

A platform that hangs together, no overbidding policy, all proposals financed--that was the winning line of the Liberal Party in the election, according to Friggebo.

"Bengt Westerberg could go confidently to the TV studio. He could not be surprised by uncomfortable questions since he knew that our policies hang together.

Brigit Friggebo herself just slid into the Riksdag on the Liberal Party's general wave of success. Since she finished as Minister of Housing after the election in 1982 she has not had a seat in the Riksdag. Therefore this is the first time that she is observing political action from the bench in the Riksdag.

During the 3 years up to now she has wholeheartedly devoted herself to the party's "rebirth"--in the party's board of directors, in the crisis group which drew up the party's future policies, as appointed party secretary, and finally as first vice chairman.

In 1983 she was prepared to take over the leadership of the party, even though she "really did not want to." Now she is happy that she did not, and that the members elected Bengt Westerberg "with his winning style."

Skillful Intermediary

"He is a very skillful intermediary for our message," said Friggebo.

The good election success has caused a good attitude among Liberal Party members. According to Friggebo the party has not been so united in a long time as it is now.

"At the same time there is great humility about the election result. We are not kicking over the traces and shouting, 'How good we are!' Instead the party must now methodically build up its organization, which during years of adversity shrank to a minimum."

The first vice chairman of the Liberal Party does not agree with simplifications such as the Left-Right scale in politics. But she maintains that the Liberal Party more forcefully than before takes a clear distance from the Left by Bengt Westerberg's speech about "the tyranny of the small steps." She does not reject the idea that her party now leads the opposition.

"But it remains to be seen which of the opposition parties' propositions will stand against the government in the final vote in the Riksdag. That will be the measure of which party is the leading opposition party," she said.

No Agreements

There will be no major agreements with the Social Democrats--primarily because social democratic policies are "going in the wrong direction," but also because the Liberal Party must now must clearly show on which side it stands. Furthermore the Social Democrats have "broken previous agreements," for example the tax agreement and energy cooperation prior to the nuclear power referendum.

"We just simply do not trust them," said Friggebo.

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CSO: 3650/53

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

ANDERSSON SEEN BRINGING GREATER INDEPENDENCE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY

First Moves on Job

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Elisabeth Crona]

[Text] Sten Andersson played a key role in Palme's rearrangement of the cabinet. He became foreign minister, but he also suggested the most surprising new name in the government--assistant Social Affairs Minister Bengt Lindqvist.

Sten Andersson proposed Lindqvist's name during a telephone call last Sunday night between Stockholm and Athens.

Sten Andersson, who has handicapped children himself, has a special feeling for these issues. One of his favorite stories is about the time he was a coach for the Special Olympics.

At an unusual press conference on Tuesday morning with many jokes and double-entendres, however, in his transition between the Social Affairs and Foreign Ministries, Sten Andersson warned against underestimating the new family affairs ministry. Anyone wanting to cut back on his turf would have no easy battle.

For safety's sake, the outgoing social affairs minister promised to keep an eye on the budget battle. One of the few times he became serious during the last meeting at the Social Affairs Ministry was when he stressed the role of welfare policies during times of crisis.

Otherwise, the press conference dealt with a wide range of questions, from partial pensions to acute foreign policy issues. Sten Andersson dodged the latter questions by pointing out that he had not yet taken office. On the former questions, he sometimes resorted to cautious, diplomatic responses. Even going beyond cautious statements, he answered some questions with a disarming: "No, now I am the foreign minister."

Torsten Nilsson looked down at him from one of the gold-framed pictures of former social affairs ministers. Sten Andersson is now following in his footsteps although, "as an old man with small children," he had hesitated, in view of the amount of traveling a foreign minister must do.

Outstretched Hand

Even though Sten Andersson, by his own admission, had hesitated to make the change, he was now clearly oriented toward his new office, several blocks from the Social Affairs Ministry. He offered an outstretched hand to many people--to the other political parties, to the Foreign Ministry officials, and to foreign affairs correspondents. He even had lunch with Swedish journalists who write about security policy.

Eventually, once he has settled in, the new foreign minister intends to give a piece of his mind to the world's leaders. He believes in open lines of communication and a frank dialogue, he said, and he spoke of previous quarrels with another powerful politician who also began as a party secretary--Israel's Golda Meir.

Andersson Describes Initial Goals

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Lars Christiansson]

[Text] Unity behind our foreign policy must be maintained. It is the strength of Sweden's foreign policy. Although there has been a lively debate, there has been agreement on the basic principles of Swedish foreign policy.

This is a brief summary of recently appointed Foreign Minister Sten Andersson's first statement of purpose. Sten Andersson first met the press late Monday evening at Arlanda Airport where he arrived from a visit to Athens, then early Tuesday morning. The new foreign minister did not wish to address specific foreign policy questions, but made some more general comments.

Stressed Unity

He continually stressed the value of political unity on foreign policy, however. He also said he did not wish to look back over the past 3 years, but preferred to look forward. He did make the following comments on the Swedish foreign policy debate, however.

"Sometimes I believe more waves have been made than could be justified, based on the various opinions. Even though there is agreement, and we must always seek agreement, this does not mean that we should prevent a debate on foreign policy. The absence of a debate would weaken our unity. We must reach agreement through discussions. The important thing is for our agreement to be well thought-out, and I believe it is."

Not Just Trifles

Sten Andersson said, however, that not all the "scandals" of the past 3 years had been trifling matters.

"Although the debate has been violent at times, however, there has been basic agreement over the fundamental principles of Swedish foreign policy. Sometimes the debate has given the opposite impression, but I believe that impression would be wrong."

Sten Andersson, who hesitated for family reasons before accepting the foreign minister's post, also indicated what his new role as head of the Foreign Ministry would mean personally.

He explained that, as a politician, he had often been the center of controversy and that "it has at least appeared that I have nothing against a good fight from time to time." It will now be a change, he said, to "be the one who must maintain unity behind Sweden's foreign policy. Unity is the strength of our foreign policy."

"A change in attitude is needed, but some of my predecessors at this post, who held the same political beliefs I do, succeeded in this," Sten Andersson said. He pointed to former Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, who also was a party secretary at one time.

In one of his very first comments, late Monday evening, Sten Andersson pointed out that foreign policy had always fascinated him and that, over the years, he had gained much experience in international matters. He also indicated how he viewed his role as foreign minister.

"There is a great deal of expertise at the Foreign Ministry. I have great respect for it. I hope to make use of this expertise at the Foreign Ministry, without necessarily taking over the role of this expertise myself. Not even the foreign minister should do that. But I hope that my 30 years of experience as a politician will allow me to bring political knowledge and experience to the Foreign Ministry. It is the interplay between these two aspects that is important at every ministry and especially at the Foreign Ministry."

Respect For Bildt

On Monday evening Sten Andersson said that he was happy to have the opportunity to work once again with his former colleague in the party, undersecretary Pierre Schori, who also said he was pleased by that circumstance.

The new foreign minister also countered comments by Conservative Carl Bildt, who indicated that Sweden finally had a real foreign minister, by saying that he had great respect for Bildt's ability and competence in foreign and security policy matters.

Previously Palme on Defense

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Oct 85 p 14

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] With all the dexterity he has gained from his 20 years as party secretary Sten Andersson, the new Swedish foreign minister, will now restore confidence in the Social Democratic Party as the unwavering guarantor of a credible policy of neutrality.

Thus, with great anguish, Prime Minister Olof Palme has given the sack to Lennart Bodstrom, who is inexperienced in party politics, and replaced him with a person from the innermost circle of power within the Social Democratic Party.

This change in foreign ministers is the most important aspect of the extensive reshuffling of the cabinet that was carried out this week.

Real Fight

By making the change at the Foreign Ministry, Olof Palme has admitted that he made some serious misjudgments in 1982. The battle over foreign and security policy has been tougher than he expected and his hand-picked Foreign Minister Bodstrom has been incapable of winning the battle with the political opposition, or perhaps mainly with the mass media.

The excuses are rather flimsy, however, since it was clear even back in the 1982 election campaign that there would continue to be a real fight over Swedish foreign policy.

The Russian submarine intrusions had set the stage, the Social Democrats' tactical vote against the nonsocialist proposal to build the JAS warplane was a political challenge, and Olof Palme's own international activities for peace and disarmament were a strong source of irritation in many circles.

The Conservatives genuinely longed for a chance to portray Palme as having been bought off by the Soviet Union.

After the historic change in government in 1976, the Conservatives became a legitimate nonsocialist governmental party. All that remained was to capture the leading role in Swedish security policy. A Conservative would be acceptable as defense minister, but not as foreign minister.

Wanted Profile

The Conservatives, who found themselves in the opposition during the election campaign of 1982 when the middle parties reached a tax agreement with the Social Democrats, did all they could to create a strong profile in the area of foreign policy.

The Center Party defense minister was ridiculed when he did not return home from a defense ministers' meeting in Oslo after the Soviet submarine went aground.

Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten was taken to task for wanting to give up certain "patches of land" in the Baltic Sea to the Soviet Union during the boundary negotiations.

A security policy program for peace and security, signed by Carl Bildt, supported a strict NATO line in conjunction with the ongoing deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

An arms buildup has never led to war, the program said, and before peace is possible, Eastern Europe must be liberated.

Plans for a nuclear-free Nordic zone were sharply criticized, as was the peace movement. Thorbjorn Falldin's proposal to freeze nuclear weapons at their present level was seen simply as a way of helping the Soviet Union. Just to make sure this point was made, the party leader himself, Ulf Adelsohn, said that Russian soldiers were eating breakfast on Swedish islands.

Submarine Hunt

After the Social Democrats won the election, the restructuring of the cabinet occurred at the same time an intense submarine hunt was underway in Harsfjarden. Depth charges exploded and, at a well-attended press conference, Olof Palme threatened to sink Russian submarines in the future.

Thus, the assertion that the security policy battle was not underway collapses under the weight of its own historical absurdity. According to all indications, Sweden had become involved in a totally new way in the international political struggle and this intensified situation would also have an impact on our foreign and domestic policies.

During the cabinet shakeup, Sten Andersson was given the opportunity to become foreign, defense, or social affairs minister.

Sten Andersson chose the position of social affairs minister himself. This is understandable, on the background of the Social Democrats' four election promises during the 1982 campaign. Two of the campaign promises were to defeat the middle parties' proposal for three qualifying days before health-care benefits would be paid and to restore the full cost-of-living increases for pensioners. As a result, Sten Andersson believed that an experienced Social Democrat would be needed as social affairs minister.

Without Experience

Lennart Bodstrom wanted to become foreign minister in Palme's government, even though he lacked any real experience in international politics, domestic political tactics, and relations with the nonsocialist parties. But Bodstrom probably would have accepted another cabinet position, then and now. Bodstrom

was tired of all the infighting in TCO (Central Organization of Salaried Employees) and wanted to change jobs.

Thus, Bodstrom became foreign minister primarily because of Palme and secondarily because of Sten Andersson.

Three years later Sten Andersson was among those in the inner circle of Social Democrats who argued that a change was needed in the foreign minister's position. Confidence in the Social Democrats is declining after all the "scandals."

Last Word

On several occasions Sten Andersson, with his long experience as party secretary, has been critical of the way Olof Palme has handled the security policy debate. He believes Palme has had a tendency to lose his temper too easily.

The conflict came to a head last spring in parliament during the no-confidence vote against Lennart Bodstrom. In his final, heated reply, Olof Palme said that a change in government would mean a "serious threat to Swedish peace and to the policy that has gained acceptance in our country."

Cabinet members such as Sten Andersson and Anders Thunborg, as well as party newspapers throughout the country, thought that was a bit too much. Instead of going on the attack, the Social Democrats should try to unite the political parties on security issues, Anders Thunborg and others said.

After 3 years of continuous scandals, it now seems to be the lot of Sten Andersson to strengthen confidence in the neutrality policy of the Social Democrats and attempt to unite the country behind the foreign and security policies of the Social Democrats.

Restrained

This probably means that Olof Palme will play a more restrained role in this area in the future and limit himself to more programmatic speeches. No one can accuse Sten Andersson of being unable to answer for himself or of contradicting himself when speaking to the mass media. Sten Andersson is a master of both using and detecting nuances.

One main security policy task for the leadership of the Social Democratic government will be to create broad political unity behind a new 5-year defense resolution in 1987.

Agreement can be reached only through an increase in defense appropriations, since the security policy report has stated that the danger of Sweden's being drawn into a major European war has increased.

As an experienced lion tamer, Sten Andersson will play a key role at the side of Olof Palme when it comes to quieting down the traditional disarmament wing within the Social Democratic Party.

New Cabinet Ministers

The two-stage reshuffling of the cabinet by Olof Palme, with the sacking of Lennart Bodstrom as its most spectacular element, involves three new cabinet ministers. Six old ministers have received new assignments, if Ingvar Carlsson's coordinating role on environmental issues is included.

The reshuffling means that Olof Palme has patched up the government where weaknesses have come to light. The personal choices Palme made in 1982 did not turn out as expected.

The changes also will result in a concentration of power in the hands of Olof Palme himself and an inner cabinet within the government.

Strengthening

In addition to the prime minister himself, this inner cabinet includes the new foreign minister, Sten Andersson, vice Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt, and perhaps the new wage minister, Bengt K. A. Johansson, with Social Affairs Minister Gertrud Sigurdsen in tow.

The appointment of the wage minister should probably be seen more as a strengthening of Palme than a relief for Feldt. Although Palme has been Social Democratic leader since 1969, it is hardly his intention to pave the way for Feldt.

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CSO: 3650/44

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CABINET SECRETARY PIERRE SCHORI: DUTY TO AID AFGHANISTAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Nov 85 p 9

[Article: "Sweden's Duty to Help Afghanistan"]

[Text] "The Afghan civilian population is exposed daily to terrible suffering. As a small country, Sweden has a special reason to react when the fate of other small countries is in danger."

Those were the words of cabinet secretary Pierre Schori at the solidarity meeting of the Afghanistan Committee in Stockholm on Saturday. Also speaking there was Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg, who said that we who live in a free country which has the same neighbor as Afghanistan also have a special responsibility in the Afghanistan question.

Pierre Schori repeated the Swedish government's judgment of the crime against human rights and the UN resolution that the Soviet Union has been guilty of since the beginning of intervention in 1979. The most modern weapons have been used to crush the opposition movement, and the need for humanitarian help in Afghanistan grows with the growing number of victims.

"Those in Sweden who complain that we have too many refugees should perhaps ask themselves what situation a refugee is coming from. Nobody here in Sweden can rightly understand how it would feel to be forced to leave their country because it is 'controlled' by an enemy who with weapons, violence and torture tries to force us into another lifestyle than the one which we have created for ourselves."

Afghanistan is 8 hours air travel south of Sweden, but we have the same neighbor, continued Westerberg.

We have something to learn from the fate of this country, and as long as the Russian occupation continues it is our simple duty to give a suffering people all moral and humanitarian support.

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CSO: 3650/53

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

CRITICISM OF FRISCHENSCHLAGER'S APPOINTMENTS

Vienna PROFIL in German 7 Oct 85 p 26

[Article by Hubertus Czernin: "Love of Flying--Mounting Opposition in the Federal Armed Forces to Friedhelm Frischenschlager's Way of Running his Office"]

[Text] Friedhelm Frischenschlager is getting ready for a fight: "I know that things are really going to pop now. Anything that happened up to now was but a prelude."

The tempest about to be unleashed by the defense minister concerns a number of appointments to be announced within a few days. Says Frischenschlager tartly: "There are cliques in these armed forces where the people want no outsiders. I won't tolerate that. From now on, there will be a mix."

Socialists and conservatives have for 28 years shared the positions in the ministry and in the army in a nicely proportional manner. Section I was a Black domain, Section II Red. Until "Frischi" moved into his Dampfschiffgasse office, everything was in applepie order.

Now the Blues are in the ascendancy.

Colonel Josef Reifberger, having Liberal Party leanings, became the chief of the command section of the Armed Forces Materiel Division. Colonel Friedrich Faltus, a Blue sympathizer, became department head for engineering construction. Colonel Kurt Pirker, Liberal, became chief of the Inspection Department, Brigadier Adolf Radauer head of the command section in the Armed Forces Communications Division.

Ernst Friese took over the Psychological Warfare Service, Joerg Suppersberger the Technical Division of the Army Command; Teja Reichhuber the 1st Aviation Regiment. Alexander Troetzmuller was promoted to deputy chief, General Staff Division, Winfried Kehrer to head of Resupply Section A, and Brigadier Adolf Ferber to commander of the Military Academy.

And Hans Moser, Lieutenant Colonel on the General Staff and Liberal Party member, became commander of the 9th Armored Brigade at the tender age of 37. Thus all three mechanized brigades are firmly in Liberal hands. Says Frischenschlager disarmingly: "Moser was my adjutant. He is one of the finest officers. Like Spannocchi before him, he was given command of a brigade at a relatively young age."

The minister denies that these assignments have been made in a systematic manner: "These decisions have nothing to do with party politics. After all, I haven't picked these people up off the street." He could not, he continued, let these people fall between the cracks only because they are Liberals.

Coincidence or not, the Blue defenders of the fatherland are continuing to gain ground. Kurt Moerz, Liberal Party official and employee in Frischenschlager's ministerial office, takes over the Armed Forces Construction and Survey Office; Gerhard Colerus-Geldern, though member of the Socialist Party, but counted among the Blue bloods, is to be promoted to staff division chief.

But beyond all that, there is one Liberal Party man selected for greater things who has been a thorn in the side of the Red-Black personnel people since his arrival in the ministry 2 years ago: Erich Reiter, doctor of law and political science, co-author of Frischenschlager's Liberalist tracts, head of the ministerial office--and, according to his nickname, the "under-cover minister of defense."

Unless Frischenschlager at the last minute appoints his chief of cabinet, Peter Corrieri, Reiter will be put in charge of the traditionally People's Party-dominated Presidial and Legal Section. Says Frischenschlager: "There'll be trouble over this. I'm aware of it."

In his first two years' service, Reiter indeed managed to make himself disliked throughout the ministry. He was given a government car complete with code license plate, obtained an army driver's license with a single examination (by special exception) and was given a service apartment in the Vienna Arsenal (building I, stairway 3, apartment 23). It measures 193.63 square meters. His rent: 1,772 schillings, which is doubled by the utility bill. Legally this is permissible: the housing commission of the local military command, composed of Socialist and People's Party members, gave unanimous approval for allocating the apartment to the Liberal Party member. According to the proceedings, "the Personnel Office has no objection."

This is typical for the conflicts between the Red-Black personnel types and the Blue minister: whenever Frischenschlager promotes a Liberal, a stink is raised by the party hacks. And if a Liberal Party man gets a cheap apartment there are squawks from those who arranged for him to get it.

Similarly, the opposition complains about "Frischi's" love of flying. In fact, the minister frequently travels aboard the military Saab 105. Last year alone he used military aircraft twelve times. Sometimes there was no

need for it, like his flight to Sweden last summer, when he all alone went flying after his delegation to Stockholm only because he did not want to miss a preceding appointment in Styria.

Or 2 weeks ago when he flew from Salzburg to Vienna to say goodbye to the Federal President at the latter's departure for China from the Schwechat airport. Since he also wanted to take in a seminar in Salzburg at the same time, he made use of the Saab. Says the defense-minister-in-a-hurry: "I only do this when I would otherwise miss official deadlines." As a matter of principle, he adds: "It is justified if it provides a minister with the opportunity of saving time." He would recommend that his departmental colleagues do likewise.

Frischi's service limousine is getting quite a workout also: since 1984 the minister has traveled more than 140,000 km by car. Which is more than his predecessor did during this entire six years in office.

9273/13167
CSO: 3620/41

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

ARMY ADOPTS NEW AMMUNITION FOR TANKS

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 19,20 Oct 95 p 14

[Report by Peter Zehrer: "Arrow Projectile Penetrates Half a Meter of Steel--Bundesheer Demonstrates 'Miracle Munition'"]

[Text] Ramsau--The first round provided the so-called demonstration effect. The "miracle ammunition," the new arrow projectile long sought by the Bundesheer [Federal Armed Forces], did not penetrate the armor slab; it merely dented it severely. "I am sure that the arrow will penetrate when the next round is fired," declared division commander Dechant, chief of the Defense Technology Office. "But it is of course possible that it will fail again." This cryptic remark would prove to be half true. The second time around, the arrow projectile easily pierced the two sheets of armor which were the thickness of a man's arm. What had happened was that on the first shot a French arrow projectile had been used; on the second, the Austrian one.

The Bundesheer has for some time been looking for a highly effective munition for its Kuerassier tank destroyer, but also for the M 60 combat tanks and the Centurions purchased from the Netherlands' Army, whose turrets are to be installed in fixed fortifications. The ultimate in arrow projectiles, according to the present state of weapons technology, appears to have been found now and the Army technicians claim that the 10.5 cm projectiles are the world's best.

The principle of arrow projectiles is that a rod-shaped, air foil-bearing body is fired at five times the speed of sound; it is made of tungsten, develops high kinetic energy and is therefore able to penetrate the thickest armor plate. The arrow munition demonstrated in public for the first time yesterday has been tested by the Army for the past 3 years, is capable of penetrating armor plate of almost one-half meter thickness. Upon penetration, enormous damage is caused in the interior of the target vehicle by fragments and red-hot shrapnel.

The main advantage of arrow projectiles lies in the fact that due to their high velocity their travel time is very short and their accuracy is therefore many times that of the shaped charge ammunition used in the past.

The combat effectivenss of the Austrian-made Kuerassier tank destroyers will therefore be significantly increased and the survival capability of tracked vehicles will be greatly enhanced.

In its present form, arrow ammunition was originally developed in France; Austrian technicians continuously improved its construction and material, in close cooperation between the Bundesheer and the VOEST [United Austrian Steel Works]. Today the Austrian product is far superior to the French one, as demonstrated yesterday at the Ramsau troop exercise area. The star attraction of the demonstration was the destruction of an obsolete M 47 combat tank. The first round from a Kuerassier hit the armored target 700 meters away in the hull area and set it on fire. Unexpectedly, the 40 grenades stored in its interior did not explode then and there. The next round, this time from a Centurion gun, hit the turret; the third hit set the tank on fire within seconds. Within a ver short time the steel colossus had turned into a burned-out wreck.

9273/13167
CSO: 3620/76

MILITARY

FRANCE

ROLE OF RAPID ACTION FORCE DESCRIBED

FAR Maneuvers Focus on Central Europe

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 9 Oct 85 p 11

[Article by special correspondent Jean-Pierre Ravery]

[Text] Operation "Fartel" got underway yesterday morning with a paratroop drop on the Saint Andre slope between Lyons and Valence. During the afternoon, Transall transport aircraft participated in attack landings of other units while combat helicopters of the 4th Airmobile Division (4th DAM) and planes of the Tactical Air Force or the Naval Air Arm began to criss-cross the sky.

This initial stage of operation "Fartel" was slated to perfect what the general staff calls the "emergency unit" of the Rapid Action Force (FAR) made up of the 11th Airborne Division and the 4th DAM. These two units may indeed be dispatched to locations several hundred kilometers away from their bases within relatively short order.

Beginning today the FAR will polish up its handling of a "mechanized air unit" including the Light Armored Division, the 27th Alpine Division, and the 4th Airmobile Division.

"Fartel" is the second exercise organized in the interest of the FAR. Of more modest scope, "Farfadet" had made it possible last June to realize a new type of operation consisting of loading on board an aircraft carrier a fully equipped combat helicopter regiment for the purpose of rounding out France's capability to intervene militarily in distant areas. This speaks eloquently of the manner in which our leaders envision the future of the North-South dialogue.

As the Ministry of Defense itself concedes, "Fartel" should now enable the Rapid Action Force to train "for operations in Central Europe."

This means combat on NATO's side in some region of Central Europe. Under these conditions it is not surprising that Gen Bernard W. Rogers, commander in chief of NATO forces, has just stated in an interview w/ th SCIENCE ET VIE how pleased he is at such cooperation with France.

FAR, which is now holding maneuvers in southeastern France, symbolizes France's drift toward a much more aggressive military doctrine.

Role of Fourth Airmobile Division

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 16 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by special correspondent Jean-Pierre Ravery]

[Text] On paper, the creation of the 4th Airmobile Division (4th DAM) was as simple as pie. [Minister of Defense] Charles Hernu merely had to decide to detach from the I French Army Corps three of its combat helicopter regiments and one of its infantry regiments, to install a general staff in Nancy, and to announce to France's allies the advent of this "major antitank airmobile unit" capable of operations in Central Europe within the framework of the Rapid Action Force (FAR).

But in practice the story is different. An attack by 195 helicopters against the Warsaw Pact would not be launched in the same way as one would stage an expedition to Africa. The general staff and the crews must then master new skills. That was the purpose of the "Fartel" exercise which took place last week in southern France. Some of the FAR units began to learn there a new type of warfare dubbed "Operation Central Europe".

On Thursday morning our Puma transport helicopter was waiting for us in Orange like a large insect squatting in a lavender patch. As soon as the newsmen were aboard, the Puma took off amidst the roar of its turbines. It is a formidable craft which makes it possible to fly over entire landscapes regardless of obstacles.

Many of the grape-gatherers did not lift their heads as we flew overhead. Undoubtedly they were accustomed to these helicopters which had been overflying for 3 days the region of the mountain slopes along the Rhone River. Here was Avignon stretched out in the sun and then National Highway A7 which runs toward Aix-en-Provence. The landscape was changing along these rows of innumerable hothouses sheltering fruits and vegetables. The Puma helicopter was soon flying along the uneven sides of Mount Sainte Victoire. Then the bauxite region and the quarries forming large red patches on the vast stretches of green came into sight.

The helicopter was now hovering in place. By scrutinizing the spot one could discern radio aerials emerging from the extensive camouflage netting in complete harmony with the vegetation. That was the command post of the 27th Alpine Division (27th DA) which is now part of the FAR. Three of its battalions are taking part in the "Fartel" exercise. For budgetary reasons the others remained at their base.

General Lionnet who commands the 27th DA explained his mission to us: His mountain light infantrymen had to hold a defensive line from Barjols to Forcal-queiret, that is, a 25-km sector, by controlling all the roads.

To the east, the wheeled AMX 10 RC armored vehicles and the "Sagaises" of another major unit of the FAR, the 6th Light Armored Division (6th DLB), were supposed to face an armored enemy division. The nationality of this fictitious adversary left no doubt since in the information sheet distributed to us newsmen its troop transport vehicles were designated as "BMP", used by NATO to refer to Soviet equipment of this type. A little later in the day the units of the 6th DLB "took shelter" behind the 27th DA's line. The combat helicopters then attacked the enemy's "second wing" in a pincer-like movement.

All of this is theater, naturally. What is involved is merely training in combat techniques in Europe. In this infantry nothing distinguishes the Alpine riflemen any longer from any other infantrymen such as these two draftees posted at the bottom of a hole, their helmets down to their eyes and their faces camouflaged with lampblack.

The exercise was nearly credible. But the realism was not complete and for good reason. When a television crew asked for silence from the wings while it was filming the two "mountain infantrymen of the FAR," only the song of birds could be heard. In case of war in Europe, the background noise would certainly be very different.

For exercise "Fartel" the division mobilized its entire medical service and even recalled 26 reserve physicians and surgeons. Some "fictitious wounded" were sent to them and the medical personnel were expected to tender them initial care and then effect triage according to the seriousness and nature of their wounds before ensuring the evacuation of these casualties. The Force's treatment capability was 300 wounded a day. Should a conflict break out in Europe, this number would naturally be ridiculously low--at any rate, at the outset of hostilities. Then, as soon as nuclear weapons were used, there would certainly be more fatalities in the body count than there would be wounded to treat. But the exercise's scenario did not deal with this problem.

General Lionnet continued his explanations: Thanks to the 27th DA, the FAR has a specialized infantry for combat in a very cold environment or in those urbanized regions that are so numerous in Central Europe. The time is gone when their only mission consisted in training to defend the Alps. They have now been asked to prepare another war.

Accordingly, the 13th Alpine Light Infantry Battalion will travel to Canada in January 1986 for 4 weeks of combat training in the frozen north. This unit, which has been completely professionalized to be more "battle ready" (as is now the case with the infantry regiment of the 4th DAM), is also in the process of receiving instruction to endow it with airborne capability. General Lionnet recalled that FAR in effect "intends to project itself beyond our borders".

But that is not the reason for its true originality, for France already had outside military intervention capabilities available and it has unfortunately often demonstrated it. Neither does FAR represent a boosting of the means of the country's defense potential since all its capabilities already existed in its ground army. Rather, the real novelty is that five divisions have in some way been "detached" from the deterrence doctrine and have been asked to prepare for this conventional war in Europe which the Americans once again believe to be possible and winnable and which they no longer even exclude triggering one day themselves.

MILITARY

NORWAY

ARMED FORCES LEFT WITH UNSPENT FUNDS AT BUDGET YEAR END

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Alf Ole Ask]

[Text] "It is no problem for us to use up the money we have been allocated, but we are dealing primarily with a sum we received late in the year that was carried over to the next fiscal year." This is how defense chief Fredrik Bull Hansen explained the fact that in 1984 the military did not manage to use up 876 million kroner. This occurred at the same time that the military was asking for increased allocations.

The defense chief admits that it is natural for people to wonder when such an amount is not used up. This is particularly true since military people themselves are constantly criticizing the politicians for permitting a gap between allocations and what is actually needed.

Why?

Why is the military unable to use this money?

"Our desire for more money and the fact that we have not managed to use up all our allocations within a budget year are two matters that, of necessity, have nothing to do with each other. The military's need for funds is related to operating and investment costs. This is to insure that we build up a sufficient defense structure. Underconsumption in an individual year may be a result of many circumstances, including delays in deliveries of materiel and supplies. This, in turn, will delay payments. It also may be because the military's many consumers may be afraid of overconsumption. Another important factor is the uncertainty concerning back pay and compensation for wage increases. Last year these matters were presented to the Defense Ministry for decisions only in December. As a result, some of these matters had to be carried over to the next year's budget," the defense chief said.

General Accounting Office

It was the General Accounting Office that first brought up the military's budget mess. Another point brought up by the General Accounting Office was

that the new guards' camp has become twice as expensive as first estimated. It is nothing new for the military to transfer money from one fiscal year to the next. From 1979 to 1984 the average amount transferred in this way was 125 million kroner. The figure for the 1984 fiscal year reached almost 1 billion kroner, however. Paradoxically, OKONOMISK RAPPORT wrote in a recent story, this is occurring at a time when officers are calling for higher wages and more equipment.

9336
CSO: 3639/29

MILITARY

NORWAY

OFFICERS' FEDERATION CRITICIZES FAILURE TO SPEND FUNDS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Ivar Hippe]

[Text] "It is surprising that the military is unable to use the real increase in appropriations it knows it will receive each year, whether it be 3 or 2.5 percent," said Johan Lohne, head of Norway's Officers Federation. He told this to ARBEIDERBLADET after it became known that the sum of 876 million kroner of the 1984 budget had remained unspent. He said it was incomprehensible that the money had not been used to relieve a difficult personnel situation.

Lohne stressed that during the past 7 or 8 years it has been clear that the military would receive a genuine increase. Parliament has discussed the amount, but whether it was 3 percent or 2.5 percent, underspending should not be repeated year after year, according to Lohne.

"All along, the military has said it has been working hard to change its operating and budgeting routines in order to use the funds allocated by way of the national budget. In addition, in its budget reports each year, parliament has criticized the military for this situation."

People Wonder

Lohne is certain that this repeated underspending makes it difficult for those who are pleading the case of military personnel. He said that people must begin to wonder when, on the one hand, there are complaints of a personnel crisis while, on the other hand, there is underspending totaling almost 1 billion kroner.

Lohne has previously criticized the untenable position of mid-level officers and he believes, without question, that the funds that are now available should be used in the personnel sector. He said that what had happened was incomprehensible.

Johan Lohne accepts the defense chief's explanation concerning delays in deliveries of materiel and supplies, but he cannot understand the large amount and the fact that underspending occurs year after year.

MILITARY

SWEDEN

FORCES COMMANDER OUTLINES DEFENSE PLANS FOR YEAR 2000

Stockholm ARME NYTT in Swedish No. 4, 85 pp 6-7

[Article by Major Jan Persson: "The Army Toward the Turn of the Century"]

[Text] In October the supreme commander of the armed forces delivers his Perspective Plan Part 2--OB 85-- to the government. The plan describes the development of the armed forces toward the turn of the century and forms a basis for Defense Decision 1987. The annual program plans have been worked into this document. Parts of the basis for the chief of the army are briefly described here.

Economy

Against the background of different economic levels, the army's long range development is described in different ways. The highest level, fully 9 billion kronor per year for the army, describes military development which compares with military development in the world around us. The lowest level consists of barely 8 billion kronor per year for the army. This level means worsened conditions for and changed utilization of army units in a future combat environment.

The different courses of action are compared in an economy with the same purchasing power as 1986/87. Herein the chief of the army has annually introduced during the next 5-year period about 5.8 billion kronor for training and personnel costs among other things, plus about 2.3 billion kronor for development and procurement of material. In addition about 300 million kronor is divided up for building activity.

Wartime Organization

In an economy with steady purchasing power the wartime organization will be developed during the 1990's toward the following:

- Ten modern infantry brigades (IB 77/91) each having four rifle battalions. Firepower will be reinforced with light antitank missile 56 (BILL) and

terminal military series (1970) for the 117 series. Protection and mobility are ensured by armored personnel carriers, first 100 important formations and units of the main elements of the brigades.

- The older vehicles to be replaced during the expansion and equipment of which will be carried out in 1970-1971 will be replaced with antitank vehicles with antitank missiles, armored transport vehicles (0) will be supplied.

- Five armored brigades (the 85th) are organized with four assault rifle battalions with tanks, 1000 light armored personnel transport and weapons carriers for the assault series. Companies will be reinforced starting in 1970-1971.

- Four mechanized brigades (the 86th). A fourth battalion, antitank battalion, with antitank missiles (0) will be organized on the antitank vehicle 3M1 with a launcher, each unit (0) and 1000 will be modernized and updated. Divisions will be further reinforced with light antitank missile 3M (0) and antitank missile vehicle (0) with missile 00.

- A mechanized brigade (0) of antitank, tank, infantry, antitank vehicle 01 and the improved tank 40 (0) are organized.

- Armored brigades (0) with tanks and armored personnel carriers are being improved in terms of protection and mobility.

- Guerrilla mechanized battalions which will be organized with light combat vehicles when they are starting in 1970-1971. The units have good self-protection and high mobility and maneuver because most of the battalions, including certain assault units will be equipped with light combat vehicles.

- 10 tank battalions will be organized like other armored units. The battalions will be equipped with light combat vehicles.

- Independent mechanized battalions with tanks 101/102. It is intended that the battalions be supplied with light combat vehicles.

- Division intelligence battalions and signal units will be organized during the 1970s. The latter with bridge units and possible anti-aircraft missile units.

- In addition there will be anti-aircraft and transport helicopters, new night antiaircraft, more antiaircraft missile units with medium range, new intelligence equipment for battalions and brigades (0), ultrasecure radio and radio link systems.

Higher economic levels include mainly procurement of more material in the following categories:

- antitank helicopters and light antitank missiles.

- light combat vehicles,
- antiaircraft,
- armored personnel carriers,
- transport helicopters.

Lower economic framework will include the following:

- tank and mechanized units will not be modernized,
- infantry brigades will not be appropriate to the threat picture,
- antiaircraft capability will be reduced.

Training

The objective of training is that our combat units will be operational directly after mobilization. The goal of basic training is to supply the wartime organization with comparably trained battalions. That is brought about by a functional unit turnover, mainly in the brigades, where the combined training will be improved.

Through repeated repetition training individual and unit combat capability is maintained and improved. The chief of the army is forced, however, to make reductions even in the training area at the lower economic levels. Then the operational ability of the units concerned is limited immediately after mobilization. That reduces our ability in the opening phase of a war.

At higher economic levels the chief of the army has included improvements in basic and repetition training.

Peace Organization

In the framework of the peace organization the following changes have been concluded:

- T 2 and T 4 are moving within Skovde and Hassleholm,
- The A 7 area at Visby is relinquished,
- The medical trade school is moved to the War College at Karlsberg.

In the fall the chief of the army will deliver to the supreme commander the basis for continued development of the peacetime organization. The basis describes the overall goal of the long range development and different alternatives as to how these can be reached.

Preparedness

Preparedness will be strengthened in order better to be able to meet an attack which comes before mobilization and forming up is completed.

Mobilization preparedness will be improved through measures for increasing material readiness and availability.

Comprehensive combined units required to maintain a high state of preparedness will be organized. This plus changes involving including basic training during the year will increase the availability of units for initial employment.

9287

CSO: 3650/58

MILITARY

SWEDEN

RIKSDAG DEFENSE COMMITTEE'S NEW CHAIRMAN TELLS BUDGET CONCERNS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] "The condition of our military defense is worse than I had thought," new Defense Committee chairman Lennart Blom (Conservative Party) said after the committee heard commander in chief Lennart Ljung's presentation of future plans, in connection with the Defense Resolution of 1987.

As recently as January of this year, Lennart Blom became chairman of the Justice Committee. He admitted that he did not want to change jobs again after the fall elections. But the party wanted Blom's political experience instead of younger, less experienced candidates.

"Then all I had to do was apply," said Blom, who is now engrossed in the reading of "Commander in Chief Report 85," the basic material the Defense Committee will use to develop the Defense Resolution of 1987.

Unfortunate Resolution In 1972

"I can now say that only today can we see what a genuine disarmament Sweden forced on its military beginning in the early 1970's when everyone, including the big powers, hoped for a rapid and permanent reduction of tension in the world. The effort toward detente came to nought, however, and the result is that the military is now suffering from the decisions that we politicians made at that time."

In particular, Lennart Blom points to the Defense Resolutions of 1972 and 1977, which sharply reduced the number of highly trained units in all three branches of the service.

Time For Decisions

"Now we must decide whether we will defend the entire country or, if our resources are insufficient for that, we must speak openly about what the military is capable of doing during the 1990's."

Lennart Blom is accustomed to tough debates from his days as a commissioner in Stockholm. He believes that the attitude in parliamentary committees is much more friendly and open.

"The debates before the full parliament can be bitter, but in committee we often seek to reach some agreement. For many years, the defense question has been seen as one on which agreement can be reached. This was underlined by the Defense Committee last spring when a security policy report was approved unanimously. In 1986 the party leaders will have to decide whether or not this unit will remain intact when the defense budget is discussed. Agreement is certainly no out of the question."

No Promises

Lennart Blom is not promising a tougher Conservative line on defense, even though he is aware that many Conservative voters expect higher military spending.

"Since 1870 the Conservative Party and its various predecessors have defended the interests of the military in parliament, the Appropriations Committee, and now in the Defense Committee, which was created along with the unicameral parliament in 1970. Thus, it is a tradition in our party to invest in a strong Swedish defense," Blom said.

Contact Man

Lennart Blom stressed that, as chairman, he represented the interests of both his party and the entire Defense Committee in parliamentary debates and in his travels and study tours throughout the country. He also is especially anxious to become contact man for one of the regiments in the Stockholm region, which is his electoral district.

The nonsocialist unity on defense issues which, during the last Social Democratic government resulted in separate preparatory meetings before Defense Committee sessions, has already been tested after the elections in that the middle parties have backed out of this type of cooperation.

"We should not overdramatize the fact that these nonsocialist negotiations have been discontinued," Blom said. "I still believe that we will be able to reach agreement with the middle parties on the major, decisive defense issues."

Lennart Blom stressed the increased strategic significance of the Nordic countries and the importance of getting information out to the people on the true balance of power in Sweden and elsewhere in our part of the world.

"It is particularly important for us to turn our attention to civil defense, economic defense, and healthcare in times of war. As I have learned, it is easy for the committee to concentrate on military issues. Economic appropriations are dominated by the military defense and, after the commander in chief's report to us on 22 November, I understand the great importance of marginal increases in appropriations, especially with regard to material purchases."

Many Leaving

Personnel questions and the peacetime military organization will be two major issues discussed during this session of parliament. Cutbacks in the area of training will result in the loss of even more personnel with expensive training, at a time when such positions are already understaffed.

"It is not just Viggen pilots who are quitting," Blom said. "Highly trained officers in all areas are also leaving. The commander in chief was extremely troubled by this and indicated that the wage issue was an important aspect, since there is a wide gap between the wages of officers and civilians with a comparable amount of training."

This fall, winter, and spring the Defense Committee will visit various military units in order to set a list of priorities for appropriations in the 1987 defense proposal.

"These trips will certainly be educational," Lennart Blom said.

9336
CSO:3650/52

MILITARY

SWEDEN

ARMY REPORTS ADVANCES IN STRIX TERMINALLY GUIDED GRENADE

Stockholm ARME NYTT in Swedish No. 4, 85 pp 22-23

[Article by division director Ulf Berg: "STRIX"]

[Text] In many parts of the world studies are taking place in the development of terminally guided ammunition for artillery and mortars, but there is little production. Sweden is far ahead with STRIX, which is the accepted name for the terminally guided mortar shell intended for the 12 cm mortar, and which is under development at Forenade Fabriksverken (FFV) in cooperation with SAAB Missiles.

In Sweden the army is gradually being reformed into an "antitank army." This reform must continue in order for the army will be able to maintain a good capability to fight tanks. The large number of armored combat vehicles which an attacker can deploy to achieve a breakthrough in war creates a requirement that antitank fire from our units can be produced in strength. The possibilities for that are considerably improved by providing STRIX. Most of our antitank weapons have a range of under 1-2 km. Antitank missile 55 (TOW) can reach 3-4 km. With STRIX, ranges of 7-8 km can be achieved. STRIX strikes the target on the top where armor protection is the least, and it is therefore effective against the most modern tanks.

Studies and Development


STRIX is an idea which came out of antitank missile studies by Swedish industry during the 1970's. Feasibility studies primarily concerning target seekers and guidance systems were carried out in 1980-82 by direction of the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV). They were followed in 1983 by a project definition phase.

After evaluating the results with FMV and the Army Staff, the government in November 1984 ordered FMV to sign a contract with FFV on the development of STRIX. According to plans, development work will be finished 1988/89. The first deliveries will take place at the end of 1990.

Functional Principles

The principle of the employment of STRIX is described in the sketch of its ballistic flight.

Funktionsprincipen
for STRIX



Key to notes along trajectory:

Before loading: fuse setting
Loading
Separation of firing section
Extension of fins
Start rotation
Start trajectory motor
Trajectory motor cutoff
Separation of trajectory motor
Activation of homing device and arming
Target acquisition and target selection
Start guidance
Hit on target

For the mortar crew STRIX differs from other ammunition in its loading and fuse setting procedure.

Loading takes place in two or three stages, with the firing section first, possibly the trajectory motor next and finally the shell. The trajectory motor is used for ranges in excess of 4 km. The firing section cuts off about 25 m outside the mortar, while the trajectory motor and the shell are coupled together during firing, and are separated over the target.

Fuse setting takes place by values being transmitted through a cable from a fuse setting unit to the shell.

At about 750 m height over the target the IR seeker is activated, detects a target and locks onto it. Thereafter guidance takes place using some of the guidance jets in the shell.

On hitting the target the warhead section and armor-piercing charge break through the roof armor. The warhead is so shaped that it has a very good final effect inside the vehicle after penetration.

The homing device consists of an IR seeker which detects the target because of the difference its heat in relation to the surrounding terrain. The intelligence of the homing device makes it possible to discriminate between very hot targets and targets that differ from a combat vehicle.

Continued Testing


Development of STRIX includes construction work and a large number of tests besides. Some examples of these are:

Tests of homing device from helicopters

Tests of warhead against plate

Ballistic tests against artificial targets in stages with shells with increasing numbers of components

Strength and durability tests in so-called "tunnels."



Caption: STRIX consists of shell, trajectory motor and firing section with charge.

The large number of tests is supplemented with extensive simulation work based on component tests. Much of the work consists of simulations because each shell to be tested is very expensive. Furthermore the number of targets available in the form of real tanks is practically zero. For this reason a number of artificial targets will be used with the same IR characteristics as real targets.

For Swedish industry it is a new and difficult area to produce "tube-fired missiles." It also means that a large number of components will be purchased from abroad. As far as Sweden is concerned it is a source of considerable satisfaction that we are in the forefront of technical knowledge in the development of this terminally guided mortar shell.

9287
CSO: 3650/58

MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEVELOPMENT OF 56 BILL ANTITANK MISSILE COMPLETED

Stockholm ARME NYTT in Swedish No. 4, 85 pp 24-25

[Article by Major Per Geijer: "Antitank Missile System 56 Bill"]

[Text] In 1979 development began in Sweden of a light antitank missile (PVRBS 56 BILL). This development is now mainly completed. The results of the development are good and the decision for procurement is expected to be made during 1985/86. Delivery can begin in 1988.

Increased antitank firepower

Antitank missile system 56 BILL has long range and is effective against tanks of the 80's and 90's. It thereby complements today's antitank systems so that the ability of field units to combat tanks will be high. With the new missile system units will have better possibilities of engaging and fighting tanks, mainly on open and gently broken terrain, but also in covered terrain with open places and passages, for example along roadways and walls, etc.

In order to maintain the desired tactical effects and suitability to Swedish conditions the demands are high. The most important are:

- portability. Total weight under 35 kg with the heaviest load a maximum of 20 kg.
- long range. About 2,000 m.
- good effect. Even against tanks of the 1990's.
- low cost. So that the missile system can be distributed to many units.
- allow short, simple and cheap training.
- withstand the extremes of the Swedish climate.

Antitank missile system 56 has two unique properties which make it possible to fulfill missions and furthermore give technical advantages in combat.

These two properties are:

- a warhead which acts against the target's roof through an obliquely downward directed charge,
- the missile trajectory goes about 1 m above the line of sight.

This gives increased possibilities of effectiveness as the top of a tank has thinner armor and the missile can attack the entire top side, not just on a side or the front. The effect on the front is also good as the downward directed warhead has a shorter distance to travel through the armor than a horizontal striking warhead.

The high missile trajectory furthermore reduces the risk of passage through nets and makes it possible to attack partly hidden targets with a high probability of hits and effect.

Supplied Mainly to Battalion and Company Level

The antitank missile system 56 will be widely distributed in the organizations. All of our brigades, commando units, independent rifle battalions and mechanized battalions equipped with combat vehicle 90 will be equipped with the new missile system.

Within the rifle battalions (infantry, brigade and Norrlands plus F-battalion) there will be two missile systems in the battalions' infantry platoons and two in each rifle company. Beyond that the missile system will be supplied to the antitank companies in IB 77 and IB 66.

In armored and mechanized units there will be two missile systems per armored rifle company and three per armored rifle platoon with "combat vehicle 90." Certain antitank companies will also be supplied with the new missile system.

Commando companies will be equipped with two missile systems.

By Troop Units Or Assembled

One missile group consists of six men, with one missile system, one antitank rifle and one machine gun 58. The group is transported in a terrain vehicle, tracked vehicle or combat vehicle 90.


Fire control is conducted outside the terrain vehicle and tracked vehicle, or from the top of the combat vehicle 90.

Within a company both antitank weapon groups operate in cooperation with each other and in cooperation with the company's other antitank weapons. This way there are large possibilities of variations within the company to attain the best combat effectiveness.

Great flexibility in utilization of the missile system within a battalion is achieved by assembling the antitank missile troops and employing them as an antitank company. A powerful input can thereby be made in, for example, an open part of the battalion area.

Training Simulators

Since no missiles will be fired in peacetime, except for demonstration firing, simulators with laser technology are important training material. But even with mobilization and preparation for a combat mission, the simulator is important. Using it, training can be repeated and a good firing capability can be maintained in the missile troops.



Caption: Principle of operation of the missile system.



Caption: The high missile trajectory has advantages.

9287

CSO: 3650/58

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

HAMBURG ECONOMIC DELEGATION MEETING--Beijing, 30 Oct (XINHUA)--State Councillor Zhang Jingfu met here today an economic delegation from the state of Hamburg of the Federal Republic of Germany led by State Minister of Economics, Transport and Agriculture Volker Lange. Lange told the Chinese state councillor that Hamburg was willing to strengthen its cooperation with China's port cities in personnel training and harbor designing as well as contacts between administrators. Zhang said that China was greatly interested in cooperation combining technological transfers with trade. He expressed the hope that China and Hamburg would develop diversified cooperation in this way on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Lange arrived here last Saturday at the invitation of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. He talked with senior officials of various Chinese departments on the possibilities for furthering bilateral economic relations and trade as well as cooperation in communications, transport, port management and shipping. /Text/ /Beijing XINHUA in English
1322 GMT 30 Oct 85/

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CSO: 4020/78

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

USSR TO PROFIT FROM WHEAT WAR

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by Dominique Nora: "EEC--United States: The Wheat War Plays the Soviet Game"]

[Text] On the table of the European ministers of foreign affairs at Luxembourg today is the troublesome business of the "wheat war". The United States has complained to GATT (the agreement governing world trade) about the European subsidies on grain exports (cf LIBERATION of last Thursday). The European Commission wants to respond in the same forum, but it needs the approval of its member nations, each of which has its own ideas on the reply to be made.

This display of dirty agricultural linen before GATT will not accomplish anything beyond making even more evident the battle of subsidies that is causing havoc on the Mediterranean grain markets. With each new purchase agreement, the price of wheat takes a nose dive. And now the biggest buyer on the planet, the Soviet Union, is demanding from its suppliers the same prices being offered to Algeria or Egypt.

Why has the United States, which is selling its wheat abroad cheap, decided to avail itself of GATT? Essentially to calm down U.S. public opinion, according to one eurocrat. "In September, Washington was about to come to an agreement with Algeria, thanks to BICEP (editor's note: Bonus Incentive Commodity Export Program) [as published], a 2-billion dollar, 3-year agricultural subsidies program unfrozen last May. We got the order in the end by adjusting our prices."

Then there were the 50,000 tons of French flour sold to Yemen. The consequence of that was that Daniel Amstutz, Undersecretary of Agriculture, "mauled about two weeks ago by the U.S. Senate", is in pursuit of the accountable party in Brussels. Not lacking either was an announcement by Ronald Reagan himself, on Wednesday last, of the anti-EEC offensive at GATT. Nor of his subordinates "reassuring" the European capitals: Do not worry, it is just a formality.

Will the Ten respond by charging BICEP in the GATT? It is not very likely, although the Commission has already made a finding. "Meanwhile, the United

States has, under BICEP conditions, sold to Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen, and is about to complete transactions with Morocco and Turkey," explains a French official. "After sputtering, the BICEP statistics (editors note: 2 million tons sold since spring) is really going strong."

This expert thinks that Paris, like most European capitals, favors a response, but not in the same manner. The Americans would have the best of it, says he, U.K., we will hold back BICEP, but you must dismantle the common agricultural policy and its export rebate system (editors note: subsidies which make up the difference between European guaranteed prices and world market prices).

Of course, the Ten are polishing up other weapons--the EEC could, for example, withdraw from the GATT Committee on Trade in Agricultural Products, the setting within which the agricultural terrain for the new "round" of GATT trade negotiations is prepared. Or they could inflict reprisals on American sales of raisins on the European market.

The rules of the agricultural game are very moderate--the only thing forbidden by GATT is getting possession of a "more than equitable share" of the world market in an agricultural product. It is therefore evident that the decision of the experts appointed by GATT to adjudicate the grain dispute will not involve sanctions. Washington and Brussels will do their best nevertheless to demonstrate their good faith.

The EEC will contend that the United States has lost markets because of the strong dollar and the emergence of new exporters like Argentina. "It is the way it is in Westerns," explains a French official. "The American shoots first, but so that he will not look like the bad guy, he wants to show that the other fellow drew before he did." Even if each of them thinks that the sheriff (GATT) is a rotten one, the game is to try to get him on one's own side.

Meanwhile, grain prices tumble. "After the American sale to Egypt, we went from 105 dollars per ton FOB (free on board) to 95 dollars. With the sale to Algeria, we fell from 95 to 83," declares a French official. "The Americans are coming close to botching the world market...and they are going to benefit the Russians." The USSR in fact does not want to pay the higher prices anymore. Has anyone ever seen a seller hold out for long against the demands of his best customer?

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CSO: 3519/19

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

POLL FINDS VOTERS EXPECT CONTINUED LOW INFLATION, JOBLESSNESS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "Inflation and Unemployment Stable"]

[Text] About as it is now. That was most people's reply to the question of what the situation would be one year from now in inflation and unemployment. There is a strong similarity in the answers from people in the street in all categories according to a Gallup/NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] poll taken in August. Even the Labor Party voters do not believe there will be any dramatic worsening of today's situation.

The so-called "fiasco barometer" was initiated when the election campaign began, and under the impression that the majority expected a nonsocialist victory. Despite cannon volleys in all directions, the average Norwegian citizen believes that inflation in one year will be at an annual rate of 6.3 percent, and unemployment 2.8 percent, while the figures in August this year were 6 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. Today's figures were determined by interviews.

About As It Is Now

As for inflation, most of the answers, 39 percent, were between 6 and 6.9 percent, while 12 percent believed that the increase in percent would be between 7 and 7.9 percent. Above this level there was only a shrinking number, and nobody any longer believes that inflation will reach 10-14.9 percent, something which was the actual condition 4 years ago. On the contrary, 11 percent of all men believe that inflation next year will come down to 5 percent, and 7 percent of women have the idea that inflation will come all the way down to 1 percent.

Union members within LO [Trade Union Confederation] do not differ from the average, and it is worth noting that Labor Party voters appear to have great confidence in the ability of the Willoch government to control the price problems. Voters from SV [Socialist Left] have the greatest belief in 6 per-

cent, however, by 53 percent. Otherwise there is broad agreement as to parts of the country, population, civil status and income conditions. We found one digression: 55 percent of union members believe that inflation will remain about as it is now.

Under Control

We found about the same relaxed attitude on the question of unemployment next year. This large political issue of one year ago almost disappeared in the election campaign, and it seems that most people believe there will be only a decimal increase in unemployment. The fear is greatest among the voters of the Labor Party and the Christian People's Party, who expect an increase of 3.1 percent, while Conservative voters on the other hand believe that Minister Rettedal will get unemployment down to 2.5 percent. Tor Halvorsen can note that the average LO member believes that the unemployment figure will come up to 3.0, which is still low on the international scene, and does not agree with the gloomy predictions from People's House of only one year ago. Forty-six percent of LO members now believe that unemployment next year will be between 2 and 2.9 percent. The national average on this figure is 48 percent.

Despite significant regional variations in today's actual unemployment, there are no great variations in the poll. It is worth noting, however, that in Trondelag and North Norway they expect a slight decline in unemployment, while in the rest of the country a slight increase is expected.

Gallup/NOI comments on the entire poll as follows: "Therefore the people believe that the 'fiasco barometer' (the sum of the inflation rate and the number of unemployed) will be slightly higher in one year than it is today (9.1 vs. 8.7). The level is low, however. For comparison, the corresponding figure in the United States was 13.2 in May 1985.

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CSO: 3639/24

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

COMPANIES EXPECT CONTINUED STRONG EXPORT PERFORMANCE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 85 p 10

[Article: "Exports Continue to Increase"]

[Text] The large Swedish export firms believe their success will continue throughout the rest of this year.

Imports will increase more rapidly than exports in 1985, however. This was indicated by import and export questionnaires for October, circulated by the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB).

The exporting companies expect the total value of their exports to rise by 9 percent, while importers believe that imports will increase by 11 percent (in current prices).

The rise in exports will continue during 1986, but at a slower rate. The decline will be most perceptible during the second half of the year.

Manufactured goods account for almost half the Swedish exports. The industry anticipates a 16-percent increase in 1986 for manufactured goods, not including shipbuilding. The increase in the import of these goods is estimated to be 15 percent.

Exports for the first three quarters totaled 189 billion kronor, according to SCB statistics on foreign trade. If the expectations of the exporters are to be met, the total value of exported goods for the period October to December must be about 75 billion kronor.

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CSO: 3650/52

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

OECD REPORT: SWEDEN TO HAVE LOWEST GNP GROWTH IN EUROPE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by Anders Nordstrom]

[Text] There will be no drop in the world economy next year, but growth in the Swedish economy will be the lowest in Western Europe.

This is indicated in the report on the world economy that the OECD will present at the end of this year.

The OECD predicts a 3-percent increase in the gross national product, the value of all goods and services, for all the Western industrial countries in 1986. For Western Europe the increase is expected to be 2.5 percent.

But Sweden is at the bottom of the list for the European countries. The Swedish gross national product, GNP, will increase by only 0.5 percent, according to the OECD. That is an entire percentage point lower than the growth in Belgium, which has the second-lowest growth figure of 1.5 percent.

Unemployment

Many economists had hoped previously that growth in Europe would increase sharply, thereby offsetting the reduction in growth experienced by the United States last year. These hopes will not be fulfilled, however, according to the OECD.

Growth in Europe is increasing by only 0.25 percent from 1985 to 1986. This is such a small increase that it will have no effect on unemployment, which will remain at just over 11 percent.

"One reason why the trend in Europe will be no better is that exports to the United States are dropping because of the lower growth there," an official with access to the economic predictions of the OECD told DAGENS NYHETER.

Austerity

"Another explanation is that countries such as West Germany, Japan, and Great Britain are continuing to conduct austerity policies, even though their deficits

in the public sector and foreign trade have dropped or disappeared entirely. West Germany, especially, seems totally uninterested in doing anything about unemployment."

"The OECD has noted this, of course, but the organization is extremely reluctant to criticize these countries in public."

The OECD is relatively pessimistic about the year 1987. At that time, the economic downturn will begin and unemployment threatens to rise even higher above the record levels that have prevailed during the economic upswing.

There is no deep analysis of the Swedish economy in the upcoming OECD report on the world economy. The Swedish economy is far too insignificant in a global context to justify such an analysis. The OECD reports only that growth in Sweden will remain at 0.5 percent, a record-low figure for a period of economic upswing.

"This predicted trend is in close agreement with our estimates," said Lars Jacobsson, chief economist at Handelsbanken.

"One reason for this is that, for once, Sweden became part of the economic upturn at an early stage. As a result, we are out in front of the other European countries, which presumably will experience a similar downturn later."

"Another reason for the low growth figure is simply that Sweden, once again, has begun to lose shares of the world market."

Demand

Ake Burstedt is an economist at the Federation of Trade Unions (LO). He has a different explanation for the low growth rate in the Swedish economy.

"It is due primarily to a sharp drop in domestic demand. The National Institute of Economic Research estimates that domestic demand will remain completely unchanged between 1985 and 1986," he said.

"By comparison, this figure increased by 4.5 percent between 1984 and 1985. Investments, in particular, have been weak."

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CSO: 3650/52

ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NORDICS INCREASE ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION--The Nordic countries increased their electricity consumption for the first half of this year by almost 10 percent, compared to the same period last year, according to Nordel, the Nordic cooperative organization on electricity. The increase was just over 11 percent in Sweden and Finland, 6.6 percent in Denmark, and 4.7 percent in Norway. The only country that reduced its electricity consumption was Iceland which used 4 percent less electricity than during the first half of 1984. The sale of electricity among Nordic countries declined during the first half of this year. Sweden is the largest purchaser of electricity, while Norway was the largest exporter. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 85 p 8] 9336

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ENERGY

AUSTRIA

RISE IN USE, IMPORT OF ELECTRICITY CONTINUES

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 30 Oct 85 supplement p 1

[Article by Margarete Freisinger]

[Text] Power consumption in Austria continues to increase more than the gross domestic product. During the first 8 months of 1985 the demand within the area of public electricity supply (not including pumped storage) increased 5.4 percent as against 4.9 percent during the comparable period in 1984. In absolute figures, the increase in consumption by the end of August was 1.2 billion kilowatt hours, which approximately corresponds to about two-thirds of the normal annual production of the originally planned Hainburg Danube power plant.

Not only the cold wave at the beginning of the year was responsible for the quite considerable increase in consumption during the current year. The continuing good market conditions and a certain catchup demand for electrical equipment also contributed to this rise. A look at some monthly results makes this evident. For, in addition to the extremely cold January, which brought a 16.2 percent increase in demand, the consumption increases in June with 6.2 percent and in July with 5.3 percent were also clearly above those of the previous year. In August, about the same 2.5 percent increase in demand was recorded as the previous year.

The forecast issued in early May that power consumption during all of 1985 will increase by 4 to 4.5 percent is likely to be surpassed judging by results thus far. In comparison, the Institute for Economic Research this year expects a real economic growth in Austria of roughly 3 percent. After Austria recorded in 1984 the highest relative growth of power consumption since 1978 and the highest absolute increase since 1976, these figures are likely to have been surpassed again this year, according to the forecasts of the electric power industry. The additional 1984 demand and the increase again expected for this year each correspond to the normal annual production of a sizable Danube power plant.

Since the economic researchers expect a real economic growth next year of about 2.5 percent, power consumption in 1986, too, is likely to experience an above-average increase. At any rate greater than the average 3 percent a year which form the basis of the coordinated power plant expansion program, adopted in summer, of the Integrated Power Grid Company and of the nine provincial companies for the 1985-1994 period.

In spite of the above-average growth in consumption of at least 4-4.5 percent this year, no supply problems will arise according to the assumptions of the Integrated Power Grid Company under moderate dry year conditions--unless sizable power plants fail because of technical breakdowns. In case of extreme dryness there could, however, be certain bottlenecks. For this eventuality the Integrated Power Grid Company has arranged for even higher power imports than during the past winter. A negative effect on the supply has been the delay to May 1986 in putting the 405 megawatt Duernrohr coal-fired power plant on stream, which was supposed to have been started up this year, a delay caused by the installation of a denitration installation.

As for the imports, Poland this year again delivers 1.6 billion kwh and the Soviet Union 470 million kwh. By way of barter, during the winter of 1985/86, Hungary will deliver 170 million kwh and the CSSR, nearly 500 million kwh of electricity. Additional barter contracts--domestic peak power against other imported power (Bandstrom)--amounting to a total of 100 million kwh, were arranged with Italy and Switzerland. Moreover, an import contract was concluded with a Swiss company for 180 million kwh. Furthermore, negotiations are being conducted with German power suppliers and, in addition efforts are being made for the conclusion of standby contracts. Total imports for the winter were increased by 500 million kwh.

The domestic Austrian central use planning for power plants was optimized between the Integrated Power Grid Company and the provincial companies. From the barter contracts with Newag and the Vienna city electric power plants, the power grid has a positive power balance for the coming winter. The filling-up of the reservoirs is about 6 weeks ahead of last year.

By pointing out the rather strong rise in power consumption, the electric power industry urges the achievement of the coordinated expansion program for 1985-1994 according to schedule. This program starts from an average annual increase in demand of 3 percent, as compared to the recent 3.1 percent, or 1.1 billion kwh per year. By 1994 the program provides for putting on stream of 37 hydroelectric power plants with a capacity of 1948 megawatt and a normal availability 7 billion kwh of power. Of these, only 6 power plants with 507 MW of output are already under construction. In addition, 7 thermal power plants with 1594 MW output are planned for this period. Of these, four, with 1124 MW output, are now being built. For environmental reasons or lack of adequate economic efficiency, 12 old thermal power plants are to be mothballed or taken out of service by 1994.

As already emphasized, this program suffices to meet the predicted demand. Supply bottlenecks could arise even with achievement of the dry year conditions especially in the winters of 1985/86 and 1991/92.

Since utilization of nuclear energy is now prohibited by law, the further development of hydroelectric power forms the keypoint of the program. This applies especially to the Hainburg Danube step with an emergency output of 360 MW and a normal capacity of 2.1 billion kwh. The coordinated expansion program does not include a nuclear power plant on account of the anti-nuclear law that is in effect. However, it is pointed out that "in Austria, too, the

use of nuclear energy in the long run would be indispensable and lifting the ban on putting the completed Tullnerfeld nuclear power plant in operation to safeguard power supply and also for economic reasons would be urgently necessary."

Construction of a medium-sized thermal power plant will become unnecessary for Austria because of a power-supply contract about to be completed with Hungary, which, starting in 1995, provides for the import of 1.2 billion kwh of power per year over 20 to 25 years. Hungary and the CSSR are building a joint power plant in Gabcikovo/Nagymaros at the Danube, whereby the Integrated Power Grid Company is to act as prime contractor for the Hungarian part. Austrian firms are to get about 70 percent of the order volume. In return, the Integrated Power Grid Company would get electric power from the Hungarian network, especially during winter and in the transition period. These imports, valued at 8-10 billion schillings, are to be prefinanced by the Integrated Power Grid Company, for which, however, the required assumption of liability by the Federal Government is still to come.

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CSO: 3629/87

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

SWEDEN

SWEDISH EXPEDITION TO SOUTH POLE POSSIBLE 1987-88

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Karin Henriksson]

[Text] Brussels--It has been almost 40 years, but now it could happen again--a Swedish expedition to the South Pole in 1987-1988.

This news, which indicates that Sweden wants a greater voice, was announced by Ambassador Bo Johnson Theutenberg at the Antarctic Conference in Brussels last Tuesday. Brussels is the meeting place for the 32 nations that belong to the Antarctic Treaty because it was a Belgian expedition that first spent the winter at the South Pole early this century.

"With my speech, I am letting it be known that, by the end of this decade, Sweden wants to join the inner decision-making circle among the members of the Antarctic Treaty," Bo Johnson Theutenberg said.

As of Monday, when Uruguay and China joined, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 has 18 consultative members. The treaty itself, which meant that all territorial claims would be frozen, will be in effect until 1991. Only countries that have territorial claims or are conducting large-scale research in the Antarctic can become consultative members. Such is not the case with Sweden, which joined the treaty last year. The last Swedish expedition to the South Pole was organized in 1949-1952.

Bo Johnson Theutenberg, who is an expert on international law at the Foreign Ministry, stressed that it had become more and more important for Sweden to participate actively in the international debate on the future of the poles.

Gas And Oil

"Questions of the environment, mineral resources, industrialized versus under-developed countries, and the law of the sea are involved," he said. He also said he had just come from Paris where negotiations had been held on the so-called mineral resource administration, which will regulate the recovery of Antarctic natural resources (minerals, oil, and gas).

Sweden is an observer at these negotiations and stresses justice and environmental issues.

Nuclear Free

"The Antarctic is also the world's largest zone that is free of nuclear weapons and the largest demilitarized continent. Both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are consultative members of the Antarctic Treaty. Both stress the importance of maintaining cooperation and calm in this part of the world," Bo Johnson Theutenberg said.

A man has already been appointed to organize the polar expedition to the South Pole and the idea is that this would be a parallel operation to the Ymer expedition that went northward in 1980.

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